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Abstract  
This is the first paper to measure the efficiency of the Japan Professional Football League clubs 
both the first and the second divisions. In Chapter 1, a non-parametric method Data Envelopment 
Development (DEA) is used and the data covers six seasons from 2005 to 2010. The input 
variables are payroll, cost besides payroll, and total assets. The output variables are attendance, 
revenue, and points awarded. I use different output combinations in order to check the sensitivity 
of the efficiency of the clubs after the original composition. This is also the first research to 
include more than one division of the Professional Football League and hence, the promotion 
and relegation impact on the efficiency can be analyzed using unique data such as Tokyo Verdy 
1969. Tokyo Verdy 1969 operated inefficiently in the second division because it spent so much 
on inputs hoping for promotion. It was efficient when in the first division. The results indicate 
that athletic rank in the league is not correlated with the efficiency scores. The efficient clubs in 
the second division are all ranked at the bottom in the league and this is because they have 
limited resource inputs, no expectation to promote, and because the expansion policy of the 
league precludes relegation. 
Chapter 2 is an extension of Chapter 1. In this chapter I check the exogenous factors impacting 
the efficiency scores but not involved in the DEA analysis as the input variables. I aim to 
estimate the relationship between the input-oriented DEA efficiency scores under the constant 
returns to scale assumption and use an exogenous variable ordinary least square (OLS) model to 
 vi 
 
check the relationship between the efficiency scores and exogenous variables. I regress the DEA 
efficiency scores on all of the exogenous variables collected from various resources during the 
sample period. 
Chapter 3 estimates the productivity and efficiencies of the football clubs in Japan Professional 
Football League. This chapter is an extension of the first chapter. In this chapter I check the 
dynamic change of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) based on the calculation of the Malmquist 
Index, which consists of efficiency change and technical change between two time periods. 
Additionally, the production frontier used in this chapter was built by the non-parametric input-
oriented CRS DEA approach as applied in the first chapter. Based on the results of the 
Malmquist Index, we find if the change in the TFP growth as increasing, declining or remaining 
the same.  
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Chapter 1: 
Measuring Technical Efficiency of the Japanese Professional  
Football (Soccer) League (J1 and J2) 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In this paper, I present a data envelopment analysis (DEA) model to measure the technical 
efficiency (TE) of the Japanese Professional Football League including both the first and second 
divisions. Research on TE of Japanese professional football clubs is very rare in the current 
literature. The data set used in this paper covers six seasons from 2005 to 2010 for the first and 
second divisions and variables used in this research include both the financial side, such as 
revenue, payroll, costs beside payroll and total assets, and the athletic side, such as points 
awarded in each season. This research can help us answer questions like the following: Why are 
some clubs efficient and others not? Is the athletic ranking in the league at the end of the regular 
season correlated with the efficiency scores?  What can the clubs do to enhance the efficiency of 
the club? These questions and answers provide insights for the fans and researchers of Japanese 
professional football not only on the athletic competition but also on the operations and 
administration of the clubs. 
As in many countries in Africa, Asia, South America and Europe, football (soccer) is one of the 
most popular sports in Japan. There is a long history of football in Japan with its first 
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introduction during the Meiji-period along with many other foreign sports including baseball. As 
early as 1917 the first Japanese football club was founded in Tokyo and interscholastic and 
regional tournaments have been organized in sequence since then. The Japan Football (Soccer) 
Association (JFA), the governing and administrative body of football in Japan, was founded in 
1921 and became affiliated with FIFA in 1929. 
From the early 1990s Japanese football experienced an extremely high-speed development due to 
the successful reforms directed by JFA.  After winning four Asian Football Confederation (AFC) 
championships (Asian Cup in 1992, 2000, 2004 and 2011), the Japan national team became one 
of the most competitive teams worldwide. The Japan national team is the only one which won 
this tournament four times in the history of the Asian Cup (Iran and Saudi Arabia have both won 
three times). The Japan national team qualified to represent Asia in the FIFA World Cup in 1998, 
2002 2006 and 2010. In both the 2002 and 2010 World Cups, Japan advanced through round 
robin matches and took part in the round of 16.  A milestone came in 2010 World Cup: after a 
120 minute intense game against Paraguay, Japan lost at Penalty Kick. However, this game 
changed the image of Japanese football and established Japan as an acknowledged world-class 
team. After winning the 2011 AFC Asian Cup, the coach of the Japan national team, Alberto 
Zaccheroni, publicly declared the team‟s goal was the final of 2014 Brazil World Cup. In order 
to enhance its competitiveness and broaden its influence, the Japan national team accepted the 
invitation of Copa América 1999 and 2011, but was not able to play in 2011 because of the 
aftermath of the Tohoku earthquakes and tsunami. 
The Japan national team has kept a high FIFA ranking since the end of 1990s based on its strong 
performance in tournaments and exhibition matches. Japan is routinely ranked in the top three in 
Asia and the team‟s highest ranking was 9th in the world in February 1998. Moreover, the Japan 
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national women‟s team became the 4th FIFA Women‟s World Cup champion team (after The 
United States, Germany and Norway) after winning the final match against the United States in 
2011. This is the first time that an Asian women‟s football team has won this tournament (China 
was the runner-up in 1999). Also in this tournament, Miss Homare Sawa was awarded the 
Golden Boot as the leading scorer and the tournament‟s Most Valuable Player in July 2011. In 
January 2012, she was awarded the FIFA Women’s World Player of the Year Award for 2011. 
She is the only Asian female player who has been awarded this title so far.  
What has propelled Japan into these successes during the past two decades? The most important 
contributing factor is the strong demand and the resulting continued investment in this sport. The 
number of general registered football players under JFA was 900,800 in 2010, which has been a 
stable number since 2000. Meanwhile, thousands upon thousands of young players are training 
in South America, especially in Brazil, and continental Europe in football schools or clubs‟ 
echelons. This number is competitive even when compared to some of the traditional football-
loving European countries such as the Netherlands and Spain. JFA successfully organized 
football leagues in high schools, technical schools and universities. Combined with other 
amateur football leagues under JFA‟s organization this solid system provides strong support for 
both the professional football league and the national team‟s performance on the world stage. In 
addition, Japan has been very open to using naturalized (foreign) players. Taking advantage of 
these players has made it possible to enhance the competitiveness of Japan national team directly 
and rapidly. The most famous examples are Ruy Ramos (1989) and Alessandro Santos (2001) 
from Brazil and Tadanari Lee (2001) from South Korea all of whom joined the Japan national 
team and played key roles in the matches. These are the pieces of the puzzle of why there has 
been such success in Japanese football. 
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1.2 Professional Football in Japan 
Professional football in Japan was started in 1993 with one division (called J1) and 10 clubs, 
called the Japanese Professional Football League (or J. League). This time point was a milestone 
for Japanese football and it also had a significant impact on the international football scene. In an 
attempt to create more attractive and high-quality matches, J. League clubs invited many top 
world-class players to join in. After years, this has proved to be effective and worthwhile. Stars 
like Zico (Kashima Antlers), Dunga (Jubilo Iwata) -- both former captains of the Brazil National 
team -- and Dragan Stojkovic (Nagoya Grampus), the most talented star in the history of 
Yugoslavia and Serbia, were recruited. Star-strategy is now considered a template by many 
countries, especially clubs in China and the Middle East. Expansion of the J. League capacity 
continued until 1998 to a total of 18 clubs in division 1 (J1).  
The second division (J2) was initiated in 1999 with 10 clubs to better structure the professional 
system. J2 kept expanding to a total of 22 clubs in 2012. Japan Football League (JFL), now 
known as the third division, started originally in 1991 with nine clubs and expanded to 17 clubs 
in 2012. In addition to JFL, there are nine Regional Leagues and 47 Provincial Leagues playing 
at the amateur level. Based on their performance, clubs move up or down (promotion and 
relegation) at the end of each year and this mechanism keeps the system running efficiently and 
keeps the teams motivated. Professional clubs from J. League have already won five 
championship titles in the AFC Championship League and three times have been runners-up. 
Clubs like Urawa Red Diamonds Kashima Antlers and Gamba Osaka are considered to be top 
Asian clubs based on their performance in this international tournament over the past decade. As 
a result, in the IFFHS
1
 ranking of Asian national leagues of the 21
st
 Century, J. League ranks 
consistently ahead of the Korean K-League and is therefore Asia‟s leading league. In 2011, 
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Japan ranked 23
rd
 worldwide among national leagues based on its influence and overall 
performance. 
Because of the high quality of J. League and the players‟ individual competitiveness, many 
Japanese top players were recruited by European major leagues, including Italy, Germany, 
France and the Netherlands during the past two decades. The pioneer among these players is Mr 
Kazuyoshi Miura, who joined the Italian League, Serie A, Genoa CFC in 1993. Following his 
footsteps, many Japanese players came to Europe for their professional careers, especially in the 
most recent four to five years. For example, in season 2011-12 a total of nine players were 
playing in the first division in Fußball-Bundesliga which means that one in every two German 
clubs has a Japanese player. Some of the players joined top clubs such as Celtic, Inter, Arsenal, 
Roma, Dortmund, Bayern München, Schalke 04 and Manchester United. Japan has been 
considered a new-found treasure by European talent scouts and clubs, some of which have 
already experienced a stunning gain in profits by searching Japanese young talent in J. League. 
For example, Shinji Kagawa transferred from Cerezo Osaka to Borussia Dortmund for only 
€350,000; his estimated value has sprung up more than fifty times by 2012. 
Shunsuke Nakamura, the most successful Asian player in Scotland, won three championship 
titles in the Scottish Premium League and was recognized by his peers for winning the Scottish 
Professional Footballers' Association's Player of the Year award in 2007 during his career in 
Celtic. This was followed in May by the Scottish Football Writers Association‟s Player of the 
Year award, and both Players‟ Player of the Year award and the Fans‟ Player of the Year award 
at Celtic's own end of season awards ceremony. Shinji Kagawa (Dortmund, transfer fee €17 
million),
2
 a promising star in Europe with his strong effort in Bundesliga League, helped 
Dormund to win two championships in the seasons 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 and he was named 
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in the Bundesliga Best XI in his first year in Germany. Many Japanese players had successful 
professional careers and became well known in Europe -- for instance, Yuto Nagamoto (Inter, 
€10 million), Keisuke Honda (ZSKA Moscow, €14 million)  and Hidetoshi Nakata (Roma, $29 
million)
 2, 3
 -- and all of them can be attributed to the quality and mechanism of J. League.  For a 
long time, players playing in Europe on the major leagues have constituted a big part of the 
Japan national team, similar to Australia, Brazil and Argentina. 
Attendance is another factor contributing to the rising influence and popularity of J. League as 
shown in Figure 1.1. Attendance in 1999, the first year J. League separated into J1 and J2, was 
2.8 million (11,658/match) rising to 5.6 million (18,400/match) in 2010. In the first season of J2 
in 1999, attendance was around 800 thousand (4,596/match) and rose to 2.3 million 
(6,696/match) in 2010. JFL (also called J3) achieved 1,642/match in 2011. All of the numbers 
above lead other nations in Asia and reflect the popularity professional football in Japan. As a 
result, the general revenue of J. league (both J1 and J2) continued to rise since 1996. In 2010, the 
total revenue reached more than $120 million.  
Because of all of the factors mentioned above, J. League has the potential to expand its 
influence. It has already made a mark in the United States, Europe and other parts of Asia. Some 
mainstream sports channels have started to broadcast the live games from J. League such as the 
One World Sports Channel covering the North American continent, and European Sports 
Channel which is available in 59 countries, and Al Jazeera Sports channel covering the Mideast 
and based on Qatar. These famous channels have effectively and broadly publicized the brand of 
J. League and make it possible for more people in other parts of the world to enjoy the games 
from Japan. Moreover, the broadcasting can also significantly increase the revenue of the league 
through highly profitable contracts. 
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1.3 Literature Survey 
The Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model used in this research was first introduced by 
Farrell (1957) and then developed by Charnes et al. (1978). It is a mathematical programming 
technique that has found a number of practical applications for measuring the performance of 
similar units, for instance, hospitals (Ersoy (1997); Osei et al. (2005)), schools (Antreas et al. 
(2006)), banks (Kenneth et al. (2002)), etc. One of its most interesting advantages is that it 
allows multiple inputs and multiple outputs to be included in the efficiency measurement.  
Ersoy (1997) measured the efficiency of 573 general hospitals in Turkey in 1994 with three 
output variables (discharges, outpatient visits and surgical operations) and three input variables 
(size, specialists and primary care physicians) by the method developed by Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhodes (1978). The result showed us that about 90.6% of the general hospitals in Turkey were 
inefficient. Only 54 hospitals were efficient.  Efficient hospitals produced more discharges and 
had a higher occupancy rate. Moreover, efficient hospitals had a lower rate of physicians per bed, 
per outpatient visit and per surgical operation. In addition the efficient hospitals achieved a 
higher rate of bed turnover and the average length of stay in an efficient hospital is less 
compared to the inefficient ones.  
With different outputs and inputs in the DEA model, Osei et al. (2005) analyzed 17 public 
hospitals in Ghana by using both Technical Efficiency (TE) and Scale Efficiency (SE) scores. 
They found 47% of the hospitals as rated by TE and 59% of the hospitals as rated by SE were 
inefficient in Ghana, so they suggested that “there is still a need for the Planning and Budgeting 
Unit of the Ghana Health Services to continually monitor the productivity growth, allocative 
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efficiency and technical efficiency of all its health facilities in the course of the implementation 
of health sector reforms” (Osei et al. (2005), p.1).  
Antreas et al. (2006) measured the comparative efficiency of the higher education institutions in 
the United Kingdom by using both constants return to scale and variable returns to scale models. 
They concluded that a group of six institutions were running on the efficiency frontier in the 
U.K. during the period 1992-1993. The data set covered a total of 45 institutions.  
In addition, a large number of researchers, such as Kenneth et al. (2002), who measured the 
efficiency of relationship managers at Canada Imperial Bank of Commerce, used DEA models in 
the banking system. After measuring the regular DEA scores, they applied the second stage of 
the analysis by using the ordinary least square (OLS) model. They regressed the efficiency 
scores on several environmental variables such as average loan size, number of loans and their 
square values in order to estimate the impact of the environmental variables on bank efficiency. 
The result showed that the managers were less efficient when dealing with larger numbers of 
loans or smaller loans according to the information from 1990 to 1995. 
Charnes et al. (1978) described the model: “A nonlinear programming model provides a new 
definition of efficiency for use in evaluating activities of not-for-profit entities participating in 
public programs. A scalar measure of the efficiency of each participating unit is thereby 
provided, along with methods for objectively determining weights by reference to the 
observational data for both multiple outputs and multiple inputs that characterize such 
programs.” Since then a large number of books and academic articles have been written on DEA 
or applying DEA to various fields. Because of the influence and popularity of the DEA model, 
many researchers are using DEA to analyze sports organizations such as baseball (Howard et al. 
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(1993)), football (Einolf (2004)), basketball (Cooper et al. (2009)), golf (Fried et al. (2004)) and 
football (soccer) in recent years. 
By using DEA, Howard et al. (1993) could identify those players who were underpaid, equitably 
paid, or overpaid based on data covering 433 professional baseball players from 26 U.S. major 
league clubs. Einolf (2004) measured the payroll efficiency in the National Football League 
(NFL) from 1981 to 2000 and Major League Baseball (MLB) from 1985 to 2001. As a result, he 
found that the differences between the efficiencies of these professional leagues were significant. 
He concluded that “the financial system in MLB rewards large-market teams with more revenue 
and the opportunity to spend inefficiently for on-the field performance. In MLB, winning is 
everything. The NFL‟s financial system does not favor any subset of franchises. All teams 
certainly want to win; yet no team has the opportunity to seriously overspend for a win. In the 
NFL, winning is almost everything and efficiency is important as well” (Einolf (2004), p.149). 
Cooper et al. (2009) assessed the performance of basketball players playing in the Spanish 
Basketball League. They pointed out that their DEA model could distinguish a good player in all 
aspects from those players with the same efficiency scores achieved by a high value for one 
attribute accompanied by low values on the other attributes.  Based on those outcomes, the teams 
can analyze the information and then make the decisions about which aspect should be 
strengthened.  
In the field of golf, Fried et al. (2004) used DEA to measure the performance of individual 
golfers in the Professional Golf Association, the Ladies Professional Golf Association and the 
Senior Professional Golf Association (SPGA) in 1998. After adjusting the pooled data set, the 
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result from the model indicated that the women performed under pressure better than the men, 
and the men better than the seniors. 
In this paper, I measure the efficiencies of Japanese professional football clubs by DEA with 
constant returns to scale (CRS) and with variable returns to scale (VRS). Each observation is an 
individual Japanese professional football club. In the past decade, several papers employed DEA 
models in analyzing professional football leagues: For example, England Premier League (Haas 
(2003b); Barros et al. (2006)), Primera división de Liga (González-Gómez et al. (2010); García-
Sánchez (2007); Espitia-Escuer et al. (2004)), Fußball-Bundesliga (Haas et al. (2004)) and Major 
League Soccer (Haas (2003)).  
As one of the most successful professional leagues, England Premier has been attractive to fans 
all over the world. A large number of academic publications study this organization. Haas 
(2003b) estimated both technical and scale efficiencies in the 2000/2001 season in his study. In 
this study, Ipswich Town and Charlton Athletic, two small clubs, were the only clubs that were 
efficient in all models and specifications. He also concluded that almost all clubs are operating 
on the optimal or very close to optimal scale. Inefficient operations were the main reason for the 
inefficiency of those clubs.  
Spanish Professional League (Primera división de Liga) has become a hotspot in the field of 
sports economics, and plenty of research covers this league. Espitia-Escuer et al. (2004) 
concluded that teams‟ efficiency was not highly correlated to the end-of-the-season rankings in 
the league based on three seasons‟ data from 1998/1999 to 2000/2001. There were no financial 
related or spectator variables included. Both input and output variables were about the game 
itself. García-Sánchez (2007) used a special DEA model with three stages to estimate the 
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economic behavior of the clubs. These stages are operating efficiency including the offence and 
the defence, athletic effectiveness, and social effectiveness. The study revealed that Barcelona 
FC was the only team running effectively on the athletic level and it had an efficient performance 
on both offence and defence. Barcelona FC was also the only team which could keep improving 
the athletic effectiveness in all aspects during the last few seasons. It also demonstrated the main 
goal of large clubs in Division 1 of the Spanish Professional League was to do well in 
international competitions while the goal of the small clubs was to survive in Division 1. As a 
result the social effectiveness score was very high, with an average of about 90% in all teams. 
González-Gómez et al. (2010) estimated the performances of Spanish football at different 
competition levels, i.e. the Spanish Professional League, King Cup and European competitions, 
during the 2001/2002 to 2006/2007 seasons. The results showed that teams with less tradition in 
the first division in Spain, such as Getafe and Villarreal, had obtained outcomes very close to 
their potential. Hence, their supporters were satisfied at a relatively high level. On the other 
hand, large clubs with a greater tradition and higher income, such as Real Madrid and Barcelona, 
showed a very high level of performance. Finally Atle´tico de Madrid, Real Sociedad, and 
Athletic de Bilbao were the teams who offered relatively unsatisfying performance to the fans. 
Those teams should enhance the management skills and improve the efficiency of their 
operations in order to please the fans. 
Haas et al. (2004) assessed the German professional league, Fußball-Bundesliga, by using both 
coaches‟ and players‟ wage bills as input variables in the 1999/2000 season. They concluded that 
“about a quarter to one third of teams are on the efficiency frontier, depending upon whether we 
allow for variable returns to scale or whether we restrict production technology to constant 
returns to scale” (Haas et al. (2004), p.266). Only two teams, Bayem Munchen and Werder 
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Bremen, were efficient under different specifications used in this research. Based on the different 
combinations of variables, they found that the key variable that determines the efficiency of the 
football clubs on the input side was the players‟ payroll. In Haas et al. (2004), the efficiency 
scores are not correlated with ranking of the athletic performance in the league at the end of 
season, so the performance of the team and the efficiency are two completely different matters. 
On the output side, the determining factor is team revenues which do not depend on the 
performance of the team. In the case of the teams with efficient VRS but inefficient CRS scores, 
Haas et al. (2004) explained that inefficient operations were the main source of overall 
inefficiencies.  
Haas (2003) analyzed Major League Soccer in the U.S. with payroll of players and payroll of 
coaches as input variables and points awarded, number of spectators and revenues as output 
variables in the season 2000. He concluded that “the efficiency scores are highly correlated with 
performance in the league, and when decomposing inefficiency into technical inefficiency and 
scale inefficiency it can be shown that the largest part of inefficiency can be explained by 
suboptimal scale of production (Haas (2003), p.203)”. 
In this paper, I focus on the Japanese Professional Football (Soccer) League J. League. 
Compared to studies about major European leagues very little research has been done on Asian 
football even though in many Asian countries football is the most popular sport and has a 
tremendous impact on Asian culture, especially in Japan. The paper is organized as follows: 
Section 1.4 introduces the theoretical framework of DEA. Section 1.5 discusses the data and 
Section 1.6 the results. Section 1.7 concludes the paper and outlines possible extensions of this 
study in the future.   
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1.4 Methodology 
In this paper, I use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) which was originally developed as a non-
parametric linear programming method to estimate the production efficiency of a decision 
making unit (DMU). In this research each DMU represents one football club in J. League. These 
DMUs can have multiple inputs and multiple outputs. Different from the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) technique, DEA develops a function whose form is determined by the most efficient 
producers. Unlike both linear and nonlinear regression models, DEA does not require explicitly 
formulated assumptions such as the distribution of the data and is a methodology directed to 
frontier determined by the most efficient producers rather than central tendencies (fitting a 
regression plane through the center of the data as in statistical regression). At the same time, 
DEA is applied in cases which have been resistant to other approaches because of the complex 
nature of the relations between the multiple outputs and multiple inputs involved in DMUs. DEA 
avoids the need for recourse to prices and other assumptions of weights which are supposed to 
reflect the relative importance of the different inputs and outputs. Another merit in the case of 
DEA is described in Cooper et al. (2004): “the concept of a frontier is more general than the 
concept of a „production function‟ which has been a fundamental in economics in that the 
frontier concept admits the possibility of multiple production functions, one for each DMU, with 
the frontier boundaries consisting of „supports‟ which are „tangential‟ to the more efficient 
members of the set of such frontiers” (p.8). The mechanism can be simply explained: DEA 
identifies a production frontier on which the relative performance of all DMUs in the sample can 
be compared and benchmarks firms only against the best producers. Efficiencies estimated using 
DEA are relative to the best performing DMU (or DMUs if there are more than one best 
performing DMU). The best-performing DMU is assigned an efficiency score of one or 100 
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percent, and the performances of other DMUs vary between 0 and 100 percent relative to this 
best performance.  
I denote n DMUs by index DMUj (j = 1, 2,… n). Each DMU consumes a varying amount of m 
different inputs, xij (i = 1, 2..., m) to produce s different outputs, yrj (r =l, 2... s). Specifically, 
DMUj consumes xij amount of input i and produces yrj amount of output r. I assume that xij ≥ 0 
and yrj ≥ 0 and further assume that each DMU has at least one positive input and one positive 
output value. A set of normalizing constraints (one for each DMU) reflects the condition that the 
virtual output to virtual input ratio of every DMU, including DMUj = DMUo, must be less than or 
equal to one. The mathematical programming problem may thus be stated as 
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∑      
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                           Subject to                 
∑      
 
   
∑      
 
   
                                    
                                                                                (1.2) 
                                                                                 (1.3) 
 
Eo is the efficiency of DMUo; xio and yro are the observed outputs and inputs values, respectively, 
of DMUo;  ur and νi are the weights assigned to output r and input i during the aggregation.  
It is tricky that there is not one unique set of weights and the weights assigned should be flexible 
and reflect the requirement of the individual DMUs. For example, some clubs consider the 
athletic outcome, points awarded in the league at the end of year, to be the most important and 
some clubs are pursuing economic profit as their main goal in the competition. Therefore, they 
will assign different weights to those outcomes in their own aggregate outputs.  
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The transformation developed by Charnes and Cooper (1962) for linear fractional programming 
selects a representative solution [i.e., the solution (u, v) for which ∑        
 
   ] and yields the 
equivalent linear programming problem in which they change the weight of variables from (u, v) 
to (μ, υ) during the transformation as shown in the Appendix. A general output maximization 
CCR (named after Chames, Cooper and Rhodes 1978) DEA model can be represented as follows  
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where ε is an infinitesimal constant. 
In the basic theory of linear programming, each linear programming problem (called the primal 
problem) has another closely related linear program (called the dual problem). Information about 
the transformation from primal to dual program is shown in the Appendix. For the Linear 
Programming (LP) dual problem, let θ be the dual variable corresponding to the inequality 
constraint with the weighted sum of inputs normalized. Let λ be the dual variable corresponding 
to the other inequality constraints of the dual problem. This model is sometimes referred to as the 
“Farrell model” because it is the one used in Farrell (1957).         
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The intuitive way to understand (3.1) is that the weighted combination of the inputs of all the 
firms cannot be more than the input for the reference firms multiplied by its efficiency. So in 
(3.1) the DMU will be efficient if   is one and the constraint becomes strictly equal with zero 
slack. For the Formula (3.2), the constraint shows that the dual variables λ should be chosen such 
that the weighted combination of all the outputs of all the firms should be at least equal to the 
output of the reference firm. Similar to (3.1), the DMU will be efficient if the strict equality 
holds with no slack in the constraint. Hence, the problem takes the DMUo and then seeks to 
radically contract the input vector xi as much as possible while still remaining within the feasible 
input set. The radical contraction of the input vector xi produces the projected point, 
( ∑       ∑      
 
   
 
   ) on the surface of this technology. The projected point is a linear 
combination of these observed data points. And the constraint in (3) ensures that this projected 
point cannot lie outside the feasible set. A more clear formation is described below. The use of 
infinitesimals (ε) can distinguish weakly efficient DMUs from strongly efficient ones. The dual 
formulation (with ε constraints) to obtain the efficiency of DMUo is the following  
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Where    is still the weight on DMUj,   
-
 are the input slacks and   
  are the output slacks. 
Formula (4) seeks values of    to construct a composite unit with outputs ∑      
 
    outputs and 
inputs ∑      
 
   . The dual constraint (4.1) implies that even after the reduction of all inputs, the 
inputs of the evaluated DMUo cannot be lower than the inputs of the composite unit. According 
to Formula (4.2) the outputs of DMUo cannot be higher than the outputs of the composite unit. In 
other words, DMUo is efficient when it is impossible to construct a composite unit that 
outperforms DMUo. Conversely, if DMUo is inefficient, the optimal values of    form a 
composite unit outperforming DMUo and providing targets for DMUo. Moreover DMUo is DEA 
efficient if, and only if,     = 1. If    < 1, the DMUo is DEA inefficient.     is a measurement of 
the radial DEA efficiency of DMUo. The model assesses efficiency in a production context and 
its counterpart, primal program, assesses efficiency in a value context. By virtue of duality, the 
primal and dual models yield the same efficiency ratings in respect to DMUo (Charnes et al., 
1978). The dual model is denoted as an input-oriented model. 
The DEA model so far assumes that the operations follow constant returns to scale (CRS). DEA 
was not widely accepted for the analysis of production processes because of this limitation. 
However, Banker et al. (1984) modified the CCR DEA model in order to deal with the situation 
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of variable returns to scale (VRS). This is also called BCC (Banker-Charnes-Coopers) and they 
add the convexity condition  ∑   
 
       to the constraints in (4) - (4.5). This convexity 
constraint can essentially ensure that an inefficient firm is only “benchmarked” against firms of a 
similar size. And the projected point for that firm on the DEA frontier is a convex combination 
of observed firms. However, this convexity restriction is not imposed in the CRS case where a 
firm may be benchmarked against firms that are substantially larger or smaller than it. The CCR 
model measures the gross efficiency of a DMU which is called global technical efficiency (TE) 
and this efficiency comprises both technical efficiency and scale efficiency. Technical efficiency 
describes the efficiency in converting inputs to outputs; scale efficiency explains that economy 
of scale cannot be attained at all scales of production and there is one most productive scale size. 
The BCC model describes the variation of efficiency controlling for the scale of operation and 
hence local pure technical efficiency (PTE). As a result, the CRS efficiency score is always less 
than or equal to the pure technical (VRS) efficiency. Moreover, comparing the TE scores with 
the PTE scores provides a deeper insight into the sources of inefficiency that a DMU might have. 
 
                 
                                               
                                     
 
  
   
 
                                          
and                  
This decomposition yields the sources of inefficiency: inefficient operation (PTF), inefficient 
scale (SE) or both.  
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1.5 Data       
The data have been collected from the official homepage of the Japan Professional Football 
League (http://www.j-league.or.jp/). Unlike almost all of the professional football clubs in major 
leagues in Europe, South America, other Asian countries and even in America, where an 
individual club‟s financial report and balance sheet are confidential, J. League publishes some   
financial information of the J. League and individual clubs‟ general financial reports to the 
public every year. The homepage started to reveal financial information for individual clubs, 
including both J1 and J2, from 2005 with detailed revenue, costs, and even financial standing. 
Also the league offers the general financial performance of the whole organization of J. League 
from the very beginning of its establishment in 1993. The data set in this paper covers the 
seasons from 2005 to 2010, for a total of six seasons for both J1 and J2. There are a total of 108 
observations in J1 and 90 observations in J2 during the period. As shown in Table 1.1, there are 
37 clubs in this time period and 11 clubs which never experienced relegation from J1; four clubs 
in J2 were playing without relegation or promotion during this time period; the rest of them (15 
clubs) move back and forth between J1 and J2. Moreover, according to the needs of expansion in 
J2, new clubs keep joining from Japan Football League (JFL) every year. Table 1.1 presents the 
time table of the clubs‟ participation in J1 and J2 throughout the study period. Since this paper 
measures the efficiencies of the performance of professional football clubs in Japan, we consider 
all clubs as commercial firms. Technical and tactical practice information from individual 
matches is not utilized. 
As Haas et al. (2004) and Haas (2003) do, I use payroll as one of three input variables. However, 
unlike those publications, I include both players‟ wages and coaches‟ wages as payroll variable. 
Payroll also includes players‟ transfer fees from selling current players and hiring new players 
   20 
 
from other clubs and the payroll of club staff. Obviously, more money spent hiring players, staff 
and coaches can potentially increase performance and improve the outcome of the club finances 
and attendance. Choosing payroll as an input variable is accepted widely in related fields and 
research.  
Similar to those of professional leagues in Europe, the range of individual salaries in J1 is very 
wide, since the top star players, like Yasuhito Endo (Gamba Osaka), and Marcus Túlio Tanaka 
(Nagoya Grampus Eight) can earn more than one million dollars a year and some first year 
players only about forty thousand dollars. Also a famous coach with successful experiences, such 
as Dragan Stojković (Nagoya Grampus Eight), can receive a contract for more than one million 
dollars and an average domestic coach will earn around four hundred thousand dollars a year.  
The second input variable is the rest of the cost (“other cost”) in the same fiscal year besides 
payroll expenditures, including both operation costs and administrative costs. Those expenses, 
such as stadium usage, administration, and advertisement have a strong impact on the final 
outcome.   
Like Barros et al. (2010), I used total assets as the third input variable. Total assets consist of 
both aggregate debt (total liability) and net asset (equity). Total assets represent the resources 
that the club can use to serve the team and the match as well. So it is an important factor for 
running the company and affecting the profit and social outcome to the company.  
Most researchers, like Barros et al. (2010) and Haas (2003), use the same output variables for 
football clubs when using the DEA method. The first output variable, points awarded, reflects 
the clubs‟ athletic performance in match competitions. Points awarded in J1 decide the 
championship and the relegation to the lower league in the next year (three clubs in J1 are 
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relegated each year). In J2, both relegation and promotion are the results of the final points 
awarded. Points awarded also decide the qualification to the international tournament Asian 
Football Confederation Champions League (two clubs with the highest ranking before 2008 and 
three clubs after 2008). This output variable can directly capture the performance of the coaches 
and players after one season‟s play.  
The second output variable is the total revenue of one fiscal year, which measures the economic 
success of the club. This output variable includes all of the revenues of a club such as tickets 
sales, sponsoring, advertisement revenue and the fund redistributed from the league. The variable 
also includes the income from domestic cup tournaments, the J. League Yamazaki Nabisco Cup 
and international matches. Therefore, total revenue can measure the clubs‟ economic success 
effectively.  
The third output variable is the total number of spectators who attend home games. This variable 
can measure how much the club performance can entertain the spectators at a home match each 
season. Since more supporters usually mean more attention to the club from the city, even the 
region, this variable can obviously reveal the popularity and influence on the local residents and 
beyond and can also be considered the social achievement of the club. 
By taking into account all three financial input variables I consider the club as a commercial firm 
and every weekly match as a production procedure. I do not include any variables from the 
match itself, as many researchers did in football related publications, such as times of passes, 
times of shoots and time of possession. At the same time, the three output variables measure the 
success of the club, profitably, athletically and socially. Average values of these variables are 
presented in Table 1.2 and Table 1.3 for teams in J1 and J2, respectively. 
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1.6 Results 
The efficiency scores are calculated by Statistical Analysis System (SAS) and the results are 
shown in both Table 1.4 and Table 1.5. Technical efficiency (TE) with constant returns to scale 
(CRS) and pure technical efficiency (PTE) with variable returns to scale (VRS) and scale 
efficiency (SE) are reported as results of CCR and BCC models. Each division has 26 clubs from 
2005 to 2010. An obvious result from the tables is that the points awarded ranking is not 
correlated with efficiency since the Pearson correlations are very low in J1 and J2. Most 
researchers obtained this result in their analyses.
4 
This means that the performance at the athletic 
level was not a decisive factor for the final efficiencies in either CRS or VRS. According to the 
result of constant return to scale (CRS), seven clubs in J1 were considered to have achieved the 
level of global technical efficiency: Albirex Niigata, Urawa Red Diamonds, Nagoya Grampus 
Eight, Cerezo Osaka, Ventforet Kofu, Vegalta Sendai and Montedio Yamagata.  All of the clubs 
had their CRS efficiency scores equal to one. 
Urawa Red Diamonds was the club with the largest revenue and was ranked at a very high 
position in the points awarded and attracted the largest number of fans to the stadium. Urawa 
Red Diamonds successfully performed in all three aspects of outputs although they spent much 
on inputs than the other clubs. Despite its low revenue and middle position in the rank, Albirex 
Niigata had a higher attendance record than most clubs and in the meantime Albirex Niigata had 
very limited inputs compared to others, which made it an efficient club. Nagoya Grampus Eight 
had good revenue with a relatively small total asset investment, so it achieved a position on the 
frontier. Cerezo Osaka, Ventforet Kofu and Montedio Yamagata all had very successful control 
over inputs although none of them led the results in any of the three output aspects. The 
efficiency of Vegalta Sendai with moderate revenue and attendance was mainly because of its 
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successful cost control. Nine clubs had a score above 0.95. Those clubs were quite close to the 
efficient frontier but could not successfully achieve it. Vissel Kobe was the only one which fell 
far away from the efficient frontier with an efficiency score of only 0.68. Vissel Kobe had 
moderate revenue and attendance during the period in J1 and lacked success in ranking (it was 
19
th
) at the same time, the amounts of all three inputs were abundant compared to the inputs of 
the other clubs.  
In J2, the situation is much better than J1, since there are 10 clubs who achieved the efficient 
frontier with CRS efficiency score equal to one. Among those 10 efficient clubs, only Ventforet 
Kofu had a relatively high rank (7
th
) during the period. The rest of them were all lower than 16
th
 
which showed a very interesting trend. Oita Trinita and Ventforet Kofu had successful revenues 
and attendance with comparably limited inputs. Mito HollyHock, Thespa Kusatsu, Roasso 
Kumamoto, FC Gifu, Tochigi SC, Kataller Toyama, Fagiano Okayama and Giravanz Kitakyushu 
all succeeded in controlling inputs and keeping clubs running in effective ways. The average 
CRS efficiency score in J2 was lower than J1 (0.92 < 0.94), although there were more efficient 
clubs on the frontier in J2 than in J1. Obviously, J2 had a larger standard deviation than did J1. 
Tokyo Verdy 1969 and Vissel Kobe were two clubs with the lowest CRS efficiency scores 
among the 26 clubs in J2, with scores of 0.65 and 0.63, respectively. In the situation of Tokyo 
Verdy 1969, it had relatively high revenue in J2. However, Tokyo Verdy 1969 had ineffective 
control of inputs, especially in payroll and other cost. Vissel Kobe had a decent points awarded 
and revenue, but all three inputs were excessive and lacked control. Vissel Kobe experienced 
five seasons in J1 and one season in J2 after its relegation in 2005. No matter whether in J1 or in 
J2, Vissel Kobe was the club which could not effectively control capital expenditures. 
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When applying the variable returns to scale model more clubs placed on the efficient frontier 
since VRS controls for the scale of the club and loosens the condition for efficiency. As 
explained in the section above, the efficient clubs under CRS would still remain efficient under 
VRS.  In J1, beside the seven efficient clubs with a full CRS efficiency score, there were six 
more, for a total of 13 clubs, which were considered efficient under the condition of VRS. 
Moreover, scores of 10 clubs were equal to or higher than 0.9 and three clubs were between 0.72 
and 0.89. Vissel Kobe was still an outlier with the lowest score among those clubs in J1. This 
showed us that most clubs in J1 were highly efficient in the transformation of inputs to outputs. 
The status in J2 was even stronger. There were 19 clubs on the efficient frontier and five more 
clubs with a score equal to or higher than 0.9. Tokyo Verdy 1969 and Vissel Kobe remained in 
the bottom positions. The fact that eight clubs in J1 did not reach the efficient frontier under the 
CRS assumption but had efficient VRS scores can be explained as inefficient production scale; 
those clubs exhibited pure technical efficiency but scale inefficiency. In the situation of J2, nine 
clubs were efficient operations but did not have appropriate production scales. Column 5 in both 
Table 1.4 and Table 1.5 is the Scale Efficiency described in Section 1.4 as the ratio of CCR over 
BCC. Vissel Kobe had scale efficiency of 0.95 during five seasons in J1 and 0.98 during one 
season in J2, which means that Vissel Kobe‟s scale was more suitable for J2 than J1. All clubs in 
J1 had relatively high scale efficiencies (above 0.88) which means that all J1 clubs were close to 
the optimal scale. However, six clubs in J2 had scale efficiencies under 0.90, which means that 
those clubs are inefficient because of the inappropriate scales. 
In order to check the sensitivity of the efficiency measure, I use different combinations of 
outputs as shown in the Table 1.6 and Table 1.7. First, I use only revenue and points awarded as 
output variables and drop attendance. Attendance can contribute to revenue and thus its impact 
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as an output is partly captured by the revenue variable. The results with two output variables, 
points awarded and revenue, are shown in the third and fourth columns in Table 1.6 and Table 
1.7. Both tables also include the original results when three output variables and three input 
variables are used in the first and second columns. The Pearson correlation of CRS efficiency 
scores between Column 1 (three output variable case) and Column 3 (two output variable case) is 
0.95 in J1 which means the efficiency scores were not significantly affected after dropping the 
attendance output variable. The rank of club efficiencies remains the same except for Albirex 
Niigata, which had a dramatic drop in efficiency from 1.00 to 0.89. Moreover, Oita Trinita 
experienced a slight change from 0.89 to 0.83. This is mainly because both of the clubs, 
especially Albirex Niigata, had a relative large attendance. Compared to the commercial and 
athletic outcome, they were more successful in entertaining the fans who came into the stadium 
on the home game day. In J2, the result is even more stable since the correlation between the 
efficiency scores before and after attendance is dropped as an output variable is as high as 0.987 
and only two clubs had very moderate changes in their scores. In the meantime, the VRS 
efficiency scores in J1 have a high correlation of 0.96, before and after the change of output 
combination and in J2 the correlation is 0.937 with three clubs having small changes. 
Next, I drop the output variable points awarded, keeping only revenue as an output measure. The 
results are shown in both Table 1.6 and Table 1.7 in columns 7 and 8. In J1, there are only slight 
changes in several clubs after dropping the points awarded variable in CRS model and the tiny 
changes all happened on the third decimal points, so the numerical changes are not shown in the 
table. This means that compared to the output variable points awarded revenue is a strongly 
dominant output in CRS in J1. In the case of VRS, changes are more intense since four clubs 
which were efficient with two output variables are now less than efficient after dropping points 
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awarded. Based only on the output variable, revenue, fewer clubs are running efficiently when 
scale efficiency is controlled for. 
In the case of J2, the CRS shows that only four clubs are still globally efficient when revenue is 
the only output variable; Ventforet Kofu, Mito HollyHock, Thespa Kusatsu, Roasso Kumamoto, 
FC Gifu and Tochigi SC are no larger efficient. This is mainly because those six clubs had 
relatively good athletic performance which brought these clubs close to efficiency under the 
conditions with three or two output variables. Under VRS, only nine clubs are still efficient 
compared to the 15 clubs with efficient VRS scores under the original output combination. The 
efficiency measures of most other clubs decrease in comparison to the original case. The Pearson 
correlation between the efficiency scores before and after points awarded is dropped is 0.914 
which shows they were still significantly correlated to the original combination and that 
dropping this variable did not significantly affect the efficiency scores.  
In J2, only eight clubs had efficient VRS scores compared to 19 in the original case. As with J1, 
most other clubs had slight downward changes of the VRS score. From all four iterations, I 
found that revenue is the most important output variable which affects the efficiency 
measurement of the clubs in the Japan Professional Football League. Efficiency measures in both 
J1 and J2 were very stable and only slightly depended on the combination of outputs and 
different technologies (CRS or VRS). Dropping attendance or the points awarded did not 
significantly affect the efficiency scores under both CRS and VRS.  
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1.7 Discussion and Conclusion 
The goal of this paper is to estimate the efficiency of the clubs in the Japan Professional Football 
League, both in J1 and J2. The data used in this research covers six seasons from 2005 to 2010. 
The nonparametric approach, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is used to measure the 
efficiency under both constant returns to scale and variable returns to scale. The output variables 
are the revenue of the club, total attendance for the year and points awarded; the input variables 
are the payroll, other cost beside payroll and the total assets.  
In J1, a total of six clubs Urawa Red Diamonds, Nagoya Grampus Eight, Cerezo Osaka, 
Ventforet Kofu, Vegalta Sendai and Montedio Yamagata were efficient in all of the models 
applied in this research even after changing the combination of outputs. Urawa Red Diamonds 
had the highest revenue and ranked second during the period although its cost was larger than 
that of most other clubs. Even with the high expenditure, Urawa Red Diamonds was running 
efficiently and productively. With decent revenue, moderate attendance and a moderate position 
at the end of the season, Nagoya Grampus Eight was successful, because it had better control of 
its inputs. Total assets was very limited compared to most of the clubs. The remaining four clubs, 
especially Vegalta Sendai, Montedio Yamagata, did not have leading positions in any of the 
three outputs aspects, but the amount of inputs invested was very limited and this made them 
relatively efficient. Their operations placed them on the production frontier although they were 
not the clubs who were attracting most of the attention in J. League. In summary, many of the 
clubs in J1 were operating close to efficiently with an efficiency score of over 0.90. Only Vissel 
Kobe and Kyoto Sanga FC had an efficiency score far below the average. 
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In J2, Oita Trinita, Kataller Toyama, Fagiano Okayama and Giravanz Kitakyushu were the only 
efficient clubs in all models with different combinations of input and output variables.  The main 
reason for this efficiency was the successful control of inputs. Giravanz Kitakyushu had the 
lowest total assets invested during the period and both Giravanz Kitakyushu and Kataller 
Toyama had a very modest payroll. On the other hand, although Vissel Kobe and Tokyo Verdy 
1969 had relatively high rankings, they were the only two clubs with inefficient scores across all 
models. This is mainly because they lack efficient cost controls; their invested inputs were 
leading the division in all three input aspects. Sagan Tosu had a clear downwards change when 
attendance and points awarded were dropped as shown in Table 1.7, because Sagan Tosu was not 
successful in the revenue aspect, but relatively successful in attendance and points awarded. This 
shows that revenue is the most important factor in this analysis.  
I have shown that the final rankings in J. league are not highly correlated to the efficiency scores. 
For instance, Urawa Red Diamonds had a higher efficiency score than Kashima Antlers, but 
Urawa Red Diamonds ranked lower than Kashima Antlers during the period. Secondly, on the 
output side I found that efficiency is primarily determined by the revenue of the club. This is 
consistent with our consideration that football clubs are commercial organizations and the main 
goal of the clubs is pursuing economic profit. Thirdly, some clubs have efficient scores under 
variable returns to scale (VRS) but are not efficient when using constant returns to scale (CRS). 
This reveals that those clubs are technically efficient but are run at a suboptimal scale. Such 
clubs can alter the size of the club and adjust their investment to move closer to the optimal 
scale.  
Fourthly, all nine efficient clubs in the original model under both CRS and VRS (three inputs / 
three outputs) in J2 had very low rankings except Ventforet Kofu which ranked relatively highly, 
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seventh in the league. Although they were on the efficient frontier, they ranked 16
th
, 17
th
, 18
th
, 
19
th
, 20
th
, 22
th
, 24
th
, 25
th
, and 26
th
 because none of them had a decent number of points awarded 
during the period. This phenomenon is certainly different from the situation of J1. In J2, efficient 
clubs are the ones who had poor athletic performance during the season. Those clubs did not 
have the expectation or strong desire to promote to J1, so that the resources they invested were 
limited and clubs were relatively efficient because of better control over their inputs.  
More attention and concern are given to the top division, for example, more live TV on the 
mainstream channels and larger section of newspapers. So teams in J1 have better opportunities 
for exposure. That‟s the main reason why some clubs yearn for promotion and invest a large 
amount of resources in order to achieve this target. For those clubs, efficiency is not the primary 
goal; their real long-term goal is to promote to J1. Hence it is understandable that they are 
willing to bear high costs compared to those clubs who do not have the goal of promotion.  
Other issues remain as subjects of future studies. For example, do the environmental variables, 
such as the size of the host city, or the stability of settling in the same division, have an impact 
on efficiency? Although they are not the resources invested by the club, they do influence the 
operation of the club. In a future study, those environmental variables should be tested to see 
how they affect the final efficiency of the club. In this paper, I checked the efficiencies by using 
the average value of each variable during the six-season period. A remaining question is to study 
the dynamics of how efficiency scores change over the years. I study these dynamics in the third 
chapter of my dissertation. 
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1.8 Endnotes 
1
 The International Federation of Football History & Statistics (IFFHS) is an organization that   
chronicles the history and records of association football. The IFFHS was founded on 27 March 
1984 at Leipzig (East Germany) by Dr. Alfredo Pöge with the blessings of general secretary of 
the FIFA at the time, Dr. Helmut Käser.  
2
 Transfer fees are estimated by TransferMarkt in Germany in 2012, one of the most 
authoritative websites in Europe to estimate the transfer fees in worldwide leagues. 
3
 In 2000, after one and a half seasons at Perugia, Nakata moved to Roma for 42 Billion ITL, (29 
million dollars) to help the club win the scudetto. 
4
 The Pearson correlations between the rank and efficiency scores are shown in the table below:  
 
 Correlation CRS VRS 
J1 -0.31 -0.42 
J2 0.57 0.23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   31 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Trend of Attendance and Revenue of J. League 
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Table 1.1 The Time Table of the Clubs in J1 and J2     
Club Name 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
# of 
seasons 
in J1 
# of 
seasons 
in J2 
# of 
seasons 
in JFL 
Kashima Antlers J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 6 0 0 
Urawa Red Diamonds J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 6 0 0 
Omiya Ardija J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 6 0 0 
Yokohama F・Marinos J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 6 0 0 
Albirex Niigata J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 6 0 0 
Shimizu S-Pulse J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 6 0 0 
Jubilo Iwata J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 6 0 0 
Nagoya Grampus Eight J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 6 0 0 
Kawasaki Frontale J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 6 0 0 
Gamba Osaka J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 6 0 0 
F.C. Tokyo J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 6 0 0 
JEF United Ichihara Chiba J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 J2 5 1 0 
Sanfrecce Hiroshima J1 J1 J1 J2 J1 J1 5 1 0 
Oita Trinita J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 J2 5 1 0 
Vissel Kobe J1 J2 J1 J1 J1 J1 5 1 0 
Kashiwa Reysol J1 J2 J1 J1 J1 J2 4 2 0 
Kyoto Sanga FC J2 J1 J2 J1 J1 J1 4 2 0 
Cerezo Osaka J1 J1 J2 J2 J2 J1 3 3 0 
Ventforet Kofu J2 J1 J1 J2 J2 J2 2 4 0 
Tokyo Verdy 1969 J1 J2 J2 J1 J2 J2 2 4 0 
Montedio Yamagata J2 J2 J2 J2 J1 J1 2 4 0 
Avispa Fukuoka J2 J1 J2 J2 J2 J2 1 5 0 
Yokohama F.C. J2 J2 J1 J2 J2 J2 1 5 0 
Vegalta Sendai J2 J2 J2 J2 J2 J1 1 5 0 
Consadole Sapporo J2 J2 J2 J1 J2 J2 1 5 0 
Shonan Bellmare J2 J2 J2 J2 J2 J1 1 5 0 
Mito HollyHock J2 J2 J2 J2 J2 J2 0 6 0 
Thespa Kusatsu J2 J2 J2 J2 J2 J2 0 6 0 
Tokushima Vortis J2 J2 J2 J2 J2 J2 0 6 0 
Sagan Tosu J2 J2 J2 J2 J2 J2 0 6 0 
Ehime F.C. JFL J2 J2 J2 J2 J2 0 5 1 
Roasso Kumamoto RL JFL JFL J2 J2 J2 0 3 2 
FC Gifu RL RL RL J2 J2 J2 0 3 3 
Tochigi SC JFL JFL JFL JFL J2 J2 0 2 4 
Kataller Toyama NA
a
 NA
a 
NA
a
 JFL J2 J2 0 2 1 
Fagiano Okayama RL RL RL JFL J2 J2 0 2 1 
Giravanz Kitakyushu RL RL RL JFL JFL J2 0 1 2 
a Kataller Toyama began playing in 2008 
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Table 1.2 Data Description J1 League 
OBS Team Name Points Attend
c
 Revenue
a,
 Payroll
a,b,
 Other Cost
a,
 Total Assets
a,
 
1 Kashima Antlers 63 319.1 3914.8 88361.9 3871.3 2284.2 
2 Urawa Red Diamonds 58.8 746.2 6639.5 2463.4 6534.2 2003.8 
3 Omiya Ardija 40.7 186.4 2886.2 1593.5 2901.5 750.7 
4 Yokohama F・Marinos 48 410.4 4236.7 1678.9 4234.6 1660.7 
5 Albirex Niigata 46 610.8 2543.3 1170 2660.5 1110.9 
6 Shimizu S-Pulse 53.3 270.7 3271.4 1346.5 3273.2 1070.5 
7 Jubilo Iwata 46.7 262.9 3514.4 1622.3 3566.9 1102.9 
8 Nagoya Grampus Eight 52.2 272.7 3958.4 2105.5 3975.1 878.8 
9 Kawasaki Frontale 58.2 284.2 3032.3 1714.8 2982.6 1012.3 
10 Gamba Osaka 60.8 283.8 3620.6 1958.8 3553 1224.8 
11 F.C. Tokyo 46.5 434.1 3434.8 1592.9 3413.3 947.6 
12 JEF United Ichihara Chiba 42 224 2976.6 1467.6 2824.8 984.6 
13 Sanfrecce Hiroshima 46.8 222.4 2503.8 1287.2 2670.9 877.8 
14 Oita Trinita 43.4 343.2 1921.6 1127.9 2021.8 953 
15 Vissel Kobe 38.4 225.2 2042.1 1374.3 2596.4 1512 
16 Kashiwa Reysol 41.3 210.4 3201.3 1643 3218.1 775 
17 Kyoto Sanga FC 30.8 191.7 2353.4 1298.2 2735.9 1224.7 
18 Cerezo Osaka 49 259 2325.8 1226.5 2377.6 497.4 
19 Ventforet Kofu 34.5 220.6 1494.5 646.6 1300.1 557.8 
20 Montedio Yamagata 40.5 202 1197 678.9 1220.2 238.5 
21 Tokyo Verdy 1969 33.5 251.2 3575.8 2578.1 3568.4 1166.1 
22 Avispa Fukuoka 27 234.3 1570.3 775.7 1677 556.3 
23 Yokohama F.C. 16 238.7 1700.9 859.4 1855.4 472.6 
24 Vegalta Sendai 39 294.6 2049.6 861.6 1870.9 1156.9 
25 Consadole Sapporo 18 247.3 1590.9 773.8 1740.3 1176 
26 Shonan Bellmare 16 188.6 1293.5 648.7 1347.7 355.5 
 
Max 63 746.2 6639.5 88361.9 6534.2 2284.2 
 
Min  16 186.4 1197 646.6 1220.2 238.5 
 
Mean 41.9 293.6 2801.9 4725.2 2845.8 1021.2 
  STD 12.9 130.2 1187.7 17066.7 1147.2 474.2 
a in million in Japanese Yen.    
b
 payroll information is not provided by some clubs in 2005 and the numbers shown are the average value from 2006 to 2010.  
c
 in thousands. 
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Table 1.3 Data Description J2 League 
OBS Team Name Points Attend
c,d
 Revenue
a,
 Payroll
a,b,
 Other Cost
a,
 Total Assets
a,
 
1 JEF United Ichihara Chiba 
61.0 222.1 2315.8 1354.7 2633.1 1489.3 
2 Sanfrecce Hiroshima 
85.7 206.0 2248.7 1188.7 2491.5 796.4 
3 Oita Trinita 
41.0 198.8 1112.7 475.0 1022.3 216.9 
4 Vissel Kobe 
64.5 131.3 1357.9 1020.9 2023.9 2800.6 
5 Kashiwa Reysol 
72.0 156.4 2994.5 1836.4 3080.5 1290.2 
6 Kyoto Sanga FC 
71.6 137.1 2088.3 1047.9 1954.4 909.8 
7 Cerezo Osaka 
64.6 170.6 2067.3 926.2 2105.6 546.2 
8 Ventforet Kofu 
61.4 192.1 1018.6 452.7 983.2 438.9 
9 Tokyo Verdy 1969 
57.4 115.0 1601.8 1054.3 2270.3 549.5 
10 Montedio Yamagata 
52.4 101.6 599.5 339.4 630.6 202.0 
11 Avispa Fukuoka 
55.9 178.0 1143.9 509.5 1171.5 444.0 
12 Yokohama F.C. 
46.6 101.4 978.6 423.8 1020.8 343.3 
13 Vegalta Sendai 
62.4 273.2 1534.3 783.1 1662.6 826.1 
14 Consadole Sapporo 
55.7 207.6 1271.8 567.5 1480.0 989.8 
15 Shonan Bellmare 
53.0 110.8 876.9 485.5 953.9 326.1 
16 Mito HollyHock 
39.5 56.6 345.4 147.4 351.4 98.7 
17 Thespa Kusatsu 
36.5 77.3 539.5 181.4 539.6 127.6 
18 Tokushima Vortis 
36.4 74.4 684.0 309.1 675.1 499.3 
19 Sagan Tosu 
54.3 130.2 647.5 319.1 760.3 224.5 
20 Ehime F.C. 
36.8 72.6 471.5 190.8 475.0 239.1 
21 Roasso Kumamoto 
43.3 114.4 604.4 226.0 600.7 138.5 
22 FC Gifu 
41.6 71.9 444.8 172.5 479.6 94.5 
23 Tochigi SC 
36.0 85.0 621.1 262.7 642.0 119.6 
24 Kataller Toyama 
36.8 76.8 591.9 183.7 589.9 170.6 
25 Fagiano Okayama 
28.1 125.0 667.6 236.8 642.1 246.6 
26 Giravanz Kitakyushu 
15.0 79.6 497.1 169.7 495.1 89.4 
 
Max 85.7 273.2 2994.5 1836.4 3080.5 2800.6 
 
Min  15.0 56.6 345.4 147.4 351.4 89.4 
 
Mean 50.4 133.3 1127.9 571.7 1220.6 546.8 
  STD 15.7 57.1 707.3 444.7 794.2 596.7 
a
 in millions of Japanese Yen. 
b
 payroll information is not provided by some clubs in 2005 and the numbers shown are the average value from 2006 to 2010.  
c
 in thousands. 
d
 calculated as average attendance per game times the average number of games per year. 
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Table 1.4 Results From J1 
 
OBS DMU Rank CRS VRS SE 
1 Albirex Niigata 12 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2 Avispa Fukuoka 23 0.90 0.92 0.97 
3 Cerezo Osaka 7 1.00 1.00 1.00 
4 Consadole Sapporo 24 0.86 0.89 0.97 
5 F.C. Tokyo 11 0.99 1.00 0.99 
6 Gamba Osaka 2 0.94 1.00 0.94 
7 JEF United Ichihara Chiba 14 0.97 0.99 0.97 
8 Jubilo Iwata 10 0.95 0.95 0.99 
9 Kashima Antlers 1 0.88 1.00 0.88 
10 Kashiwa Reysol 15 0.99 0.99 1.00 
11 Kawasaki Frontale 4 0.94 1.00 0.94 
12 Kyoto Sanga FC 22 0.77 0.79 0.96 
13 Montedio Yamagata 17 1.00 1.00 1.00 
14 Nagoya Grampus Eight 6 1.00 1.00 1.00 
15 Oita Trinita 13 0.89 0.95 0.94 
16 Omiya Ardija 16 0.97 0.97 1.00 
17 Sanfrecce Hiroshima 9 0.88 0.91 0.97 
18 Shimizu S-Pulse 5 0.99 1.00 0.99 
19 Shonan Bellmare 25 0.95 1.00 0.95 
20 Tokyo Verdy 1969 21 0.93 0.96 0.97 
21 Urawa Red Diamonds 3 1.00 1.00 1.00 
22 Vegalta Sendai 18 1.00 1.00 1.00 
23 Ventforet Kofu 20 1.00 1.00 1.00 
24 Vissel Kobe 19 0.68 0.72 0.95 
25 Yokohama F.C. 25 0.92 0.94 0.97 
26 Yokohama F・Marinos 8 0.96 0.97 1.00 
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Table 1.5 Results From J2 
 
OBS DMU Rank CRS VRS SE 
1 Avispa Fukuoka 10 0.92 0.98 0.94 
2 Cerezo Osaka 4 0.91 1.00 0.91 
3 Consadole Sapporo 11 0.82 1.00 0.82 
4 Ehime F.C. 21 0.98 0.98 1.00 
5 Fagiano Okayama 25 1.00 1.00 1.00 
6 FC Gifu 17 1.00 1.00 1.00 
7 Giravanz Kitakyushu 26 1.00 1.00 1.00 
8 JEF United Ichihara Chiba 8 0.81 1.00 0.81 
9 Kashiwa Reysol 2 0.89 1.00 0.89 
10 Kataller Toyama 20 1.00 1.00 1.00 
11 Kyoto Sanga FC 3 0.98 1.00 0.98 
12 Mito HollyHock 19 1.00 1.00 1.00 
13 Montedio Yamagata 14 0.93 1.00 0.93 
14 Oita Trinita 18 1.00 1.00 1.00 
15 Roasso Kumamoto 16 1.00 1.00 1.00 
16 Sagan Tosu 12 0.92 1.00 0.92 
17 Sanfrecce Hiroshima 1 0.83 1.00 0.83 
18 Shonan Bellmare 13 0.87 0.90 0.97 
19 Thespa Kusatsu 22 1.00 1.00 1.00 
20 Tochigi SC 24 1.00 1.00 1.00 
21 Tokushima Vortis 23 0.95 0.96 0.99 
22 Tokyo Verdy 1969 9 0.65 0.75 0.86 
23 Vegalta Sendai 6 0.85 1.00 0.85 
24 Ventforet Kofu 7 1.00 1.00 1.00 
25 Vissel Kobe 5 0.63 0.64 0.98 
26 Yokohama F.C. 15 0.91 0.94 0.97 
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Table 1.6 DEA Result for Different Output Combination J1 
    Revenue Point Attendance   Point Revenue   Revenue   Point   Attendance 
OBS DMU CRS VRS   CRS VRS   CRS VRS   CRS VRS   CRS VRS 
1 Albirex Niigata 1.00 1.00 
 
0.89 0.93 
 
0.88 0.89 
 
0.66 0.82 
 
1.00 1.00 
2 Avispa Fukuoka 0.90 0.92 
 
0.88 0.91 
 
0.88 0.91 
 
0.58 0.84 
 
0.69 0.88 
3 Cerezo Osaka 1.00 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 
 
0.67 1.00 
 
0.66 0.72 
4 Consadole Sapporo 0.86 0.89 
 
0.84 0.88 
 
0.84 0.88 
 
0.39 0.84 
 
0.62 0.88 
5 F.C. Tokyo 0.99 1.00 
 
0.99 0.99 
 
0.99 0.99 
 
0.49 0.63 
 
0.70 0.77 
6 Gamba Osaka 0.94 1.00 
 
0.94 1.00 
 
0.94 0.97 
 
0.52 1.00 
 
0.38 0.42 
7 JEF United Ichihara Chiba 0.97 0.99 
 
0.97 0.99 
 
0.97 0.99 
 
0.48 0.52 
 
0.38 0.46 
8 Jubilo Iwata 0.95 0.95 
 
0.95 0.95 
 
0.95 0.95 
 
0.48 0.62 
 
0.39 0.45 
9 Kashima Antlers 0.88 1.00 
 
0.88 1.00 
 
0.88 0.97 
 
0.49 1.00 
 
0.36 0.42 
10 Kashiwa Reysol 0.99 0.99 
 
0.99 0.99 
 
0.99 0.99 
 
0.42 0.44 
 
0.37 0.41 
11 Kawasaki Frontale 0.94 1.00 
 
0.94 1.00 
 
0.94 0.96 
 
0.59 1.00 
 
0.46 0.51 
12 Kyoto Sanga FC 0.77 0.79 
 
0.77 0.79 
 
0.77 0.79 
 
0.40 0.50 
 
0.31 0.50 
13 Montedio Yamagata 1.00 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 
14 Nagoya Grampus Eight 1.00 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 
 
0.42 0.77 
 
0.40 0.44 
15 Oita Trinita 0.89 0.95 
 
0.83 0.90 
 
0.83 0.86 
 
0.65 0.75 
 
0.74 0.85 
16 Omiya Ardija 0.97 0.97 
 
0.97 0.97 
 
0.97 0.97 
 
0.43 0.43 
 
0.35 0.42 
17 Sanfrecce Hiroshima 0.88 0.91 
 
0.88 0.91 
 
0.88 0.88 
 
0.61 0.79 
 
0.41 0.52 
18 Shimizu S-Pulse 0.99 1.00 
 
0.99 1.00 
 
0.96 0.96 
 
0.66 1.00 
 
0.43 0.54 
19 Shonan Bellmare 0.95 1.00 
 
0.95 1.00 
 
0.95 1.00 
 
0.41 1.00 
 
0.78 1.00 
20 Tokyo Verdy 1969 0.93 0.96 
 
0.93 0.96 
 
0.93 0.96 
 
0.28 0.34 
 
0.35 0.39 
21 Urawa Red Diamonds 1.00 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 
 
0.40 0.72 
 
0.64 1.00 
22 Vegalta Sendai 1.00 1.00 
 
0.99 1.00 
 
0.99 1.00 
 
0.76 0.78 
 
0.69 0.87 
23 Ventforet Kofu 1.00 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 
 
0.89 1.00 
 
0.74 1.00 
24 Vissel Kobe 0.68 0.72 
 
0.68 0.72 
 
0.68 0.72 
 
0.47 0.49 
 
0.38 0.50 
25 Yokohama F.C. 0.92 0.94 
 
0.92 0.94 
 
0.92 0.94 
 
0.31 0.75 
 
0.75 0.82 
26 Yokohama F・Marinos 0.96 0.97   0.96 0.97   0.96 0.97   0.48 0.64   0.47 0.54 
               Correlation to 3 outputs 1.00 1.00   0.95 0.97   0.94 0.92   0.32 0.42   0.36 0.18 
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Table 1.7 DEA Result for Different Output Combination J2 
    
Revenue Point 
Attendance   Point Revenue   Revenue   Point   Attendance 
OBS DMU CRS VRS   CRS VRS   CRS VRS   CRS VRS   CRS VRS 
1 Avispa Fukuoka 0.92 0.98 
 
0.92 0.96 
 
0.91 0.94 
 
0.42 0.69 
 
0.78 0.80 
2 Cerezo Osaka 0.91 1.00 
 
0.91 1.00 
 
0.91 1.00 
 
0.29 0.75 
 
0.42 0.42 
3 Consadole Sapporo 0.82 1.00 
 
0.82 0.96 
 
0.82 0.93 
 
0.37 0.61 
 
0.72 0.90 
4 Ehime F.C. 0.98 0.98 
 
0.98 0.98 
 
0.94 0.98 
 
0.72 0.77 
 
0.78 0.88 
5 Fagiano Okayama 1.00 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 
 
0.44 0.62 
 
1.00 1.00 
6 FC Gifu 1.00 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 
 
0.91 0.97 
 
1.00 1.00 
 
0.87 0.97 
7 Giravanz Kitakyushu 1.00 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 
 
0.38 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 
8 JEF United Ichihara Chiba 0.81 1.00 
 
0.81 0.88 
 
0.81 0.88 
 
0.21 0.37 
 
0.43 0.46 
9 Kashiwa Reysol 0.89 1.00 
 
0.89 1.00 
 
0.89 1.00 
 
0.21 0.53 
 
0.26 0.26 
10 Kataller Toyama 1.00 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 
 
0.75 0.80 
 
0.80 0.91 
11 Kyoto Sanga FC 0.98 1.00 
 
0.98 1.00 
 
0.98 1.00 
 
0.33 0.83 
 
0.36 0.36 
12 Mito HollyHock 1.00 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 
 
0.92 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 
 
0.83 1.00 
13 Montedio Yamagata 0.93 1.00 
 
0.93 1.00 
 
0.87 0.91 
 
0.74 1.00 
 
0.83 0.86 
14 Oita Trinita 1.00 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 
 
0.44 0.44 
 
1.00 1.00 
15 Roasso Kumamoto 1.00 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 
 
0.97 0.98 
 
0.75 0.85 
 
1.00 1.00 
16 Sagan Tosu 0.92 1.00 
 
0.84 1.00 
 
0.80 0.81 
 
0.64 1.00 
 
0.88 0.89 
17 Sanfrecce Hiroshima 0.83 1.00 
 
0.83 1.00 
 
0.83 0.93 
 
0.31 1.00 
 
0.42 0.44 
18 Shonan Bellmare 0.87 0.90 
 
0.87 0.90 
 
0.84 0.86 
 
0.49 0.70 
 
0.60 0.61 
19 Thespa Kusatsu 1.00 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 
 
0.99 0.99 
 
0.75 0.81 
 
0.83 0.92 
20 Tochigi SC 1.00 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 
 
0.95 0.96 
 
0.68 0.78 
 
0.78 0.80 
21 Tokushima Vortis 0.95 0.96 
 
0.95 0.96 
 
0.93 0.96 
 
0.48 0.52 
 
0.56 0.63 
22 Tokyo Verdy 1969 0.65 0.75 
 
0.65 0.75 
 
0.65 0.70 
 
0.25 0.51 
 
0.26 0.27 
23 Vegalta Sendai 0.85 1.00 
 
0.85 0.90 
 
0.85 0.88 
 
0.33 0.63 
 
0.84 1.00 
24 Ventforet Kofu 1.00 1.00 
 
0.98 1.00 
 
0.95 0.96 
 
0.56 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 
25 Vissel Kobe 0.63 0.64 
 
0.63 0.64 
 
0.62 0.62 
 
0.28 0.58 
 
0.33 0.33 
26 Yokohama F.C. 0.91 0.94   0.91 0.94   0.90 0.92   0.41 0.54   0.51 0.53 
                Correlation to 3 outputs 1.00 1.00   0.99 0.94   0.95 0.87   0.61 0.34   0.68 0.51 
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Chapter: 2 
Factors Affecting the Production Efficiency in Japan Professional  
Football League  
 
2.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1, I estimated the production efficiency in Japan Professional Football League in a 
framework of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). This chapter is an extension of Chapter 1 
where I check the exogenous factors impacting the efficiency scores. For example, the city 
location should have a strong influence on the revenue of the club because a larger pool of 
potential audience can increase the incomes from advertisement and clubs‟ merchandise sale. In 
addition, time spent on the way to the stadium can effect one‟s decision on whether or not to go 
to the stadium on the game day and so on. This chapter aims at estimating the relationship 
between the input-oriented DEA efficiency scores under the Constant-Returns-to-Scale 
assumption and the exogenous variables. An ordinary least square (OLS) model is used. I regress 
the DEA efficiency scores on all of the environmental variables collected from various resources 
during the sample period. 
This approach is similar to Kenneth et al. (2002) measured the efficiency of relationship 
managers at Canada Imperial Bank of Commerce. In a second stage of the analysis, he regressed 
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the efficiency scores on several environmental variables such as average loan size and the 
number of loans in order to estimate effect of changes in environmental variables. He found that 
the managers were less efficient when dealing with large numbers of loans or small loans.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 is the description of the data 
set used in this chapter and Section 2.3 presents the OLS model and the estimation result. The 
last section is the conclusion based on the result.  
 
2.2 Data  
As in Kenneth et al. (2002), I perform a similar OLS estimation using the DEA efficiency scores 
calculated in the first chapter as the dependent variable. I use a total of six independent 
exogenous variables for J1 and five for J2. All variables cover the six seasons between 2005 and 
2010. There are 26 observations in each division. Value of the variables used (except dummy 
variables) is averaged across all seasons in which a club participated in a division. 
Explanatory variables include cards per game, gross domestic product (GDP), win rate, average 
travel time, major population center and players on the Japan national team. The variables are 
discussed below. Card/game is a variable representing the average number of both yellow cards 
and red cards in one game during the sample period. I add up the card number in each game and 
then divide it by the total number of games to obtain this independent variable. Since the number 
of clubs in J2 every year is different, this is a reasonable way to represent the average number of 
cards per game despite various numbers of games J2 clubs have to play. As is common 
knowledge, cards are used by the referees to punish these who foul opponents or use improper 
actions in the game. This punishment is divided into two levels: The first level is normal foul, 
 41 
 
such as tripping, diving or delay of game and will be given a yellow card. The player will be 
banished after the second yellow card is given. The second level is a serious foul, such as serious 
striking, offensive communication or action against the referees in the game. These behaviors 
will be given a red card and the player will be banished. Hence, the number of cards is an 
effective factor to measure the intensity of the game. The main reason to add this exogenous 
variable is to check the direction of its influence. For example, more fouls could break the 
continuity of the game which makes the game lose aesthetic appeal and shortens its net play time; 
on the other hand, more fouls means the game is even more competitive, which can be attractive 
to passionate fans. We will be able to see how these two opposing forces balance with the OLS 
estimation. 
The second independent environmental variable is the gross domestic product (GDP) in the 
province where the club‟s home base is. The intuition of adding this variable is that some clubs 
are located in highly developed provinces which have large commercial cities, for instance 
Tokyo Verdy 1969 and Nagoya Grampus Eight. Conversely, some of them are located in small 
towns with a smaller economy, such as Sagan Tosu and Montedio Yamagata. This variable can 
estimate the influence of the economic background in the local province on the football club.  
The third variable is the win rate in all of the games the club played during the period. I sum up 
the number of wins in all the games and then divide by the total number of games number to 
obtain this exogenous factor. Obviously, the more games the club wins during a season the more 
will be points, ticket sales, advertisement revenue and redistribution of money from J. League. 
To consistently win games, the quality of players, coaches and the administration team are the 
decisive factors. To keep all of those factors on a high quality level in order to maintain a great 
win rate, the club has to invest a large amount of money to hire top domestic and international 
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stars, famous coaches and experienced administrators. As described in the first chapter, the 
average wages of a top star and a first-class coach in J. League are both more than one million 
U.S. dollars and the transfer fee is sometimes more than two million dollars. These investments 
have a negative influence on the efficiency score whereas the potential increase in win rate 
following these investments has a positive effect. The OLS estimation will tell us which of these 
two opposing effects dominate.  
The fourth variable is the average time spent to travel to the stadium. J. League started to 
investigate the characteristics of the supporters for both J1 and J2 in 2004. This resulted in “J. 
League Fan Survey Summary Report,” published on the official website of J. League 
(http://www.j-league.or.jp/) the following year. This report includes many topics such as fans‟ 
motivation, fans‟ behavior and summary characteristics, such as the fan‟s age and gender. I 
select travel time to stadium as one of the independent variables in the OLS model because this 
factor has a direct effect on the fans‟ choice of whether or not to go to the stadium to support the 
home team on game day. The implicit intuition here is very interesting and mixed. On one hand, 
there tend to be less traffic jams in relatively underdeveloped regions compared with big cities; 
On the other hand, people reside more densely in big cities which may reduce their physical 
distance from the stadium. 
In Japan, there are three main metropolis circles, Capital Circle, Chukyo Circle and Kinki Circle 
which are centered in Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka, respectively. The fifth independent variable is 
a dummy equal to one if the location of the club is in one of the three metropolis circles. About 
66 million people, out of a total of 130 million in Japan, live in these three metropolis circles. 
This concentration of population implies easy access to many alternative forms of sports and 
entertainment, which compete with football to attract audiences and revenues.  
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The last variable is another dummy equal to one if the club had a player(s) who joined the Japan 
national team during the period covered by the data set. From 2005 to 2010, Japan participated in 
four international tournaments, the 2007 and 2011 AFC Asian Cup and 2006 and 2010 FIFA 
World Cup. Although the 2011 AFC Asian Cup is out of coverage of the data set, the 
qualifications for representation in the Japan national team in this tournament were based on the 
performance of the players in 2010. So it is reasonable to include this event in the construction of 
this variable. There were about a hundred people on the various national teams and 70 of them 
were from 11 J. League clubs. The rest of them were from Japan Europe group, since many top 
Japanese football stars were playing in European major leagues during the regular seasons. They 
only come back to play for Japan national team in important events and international friendship 
games. Only one club that provided these elite players, Vissel Kobe, experienced relegation to J2. 
This happened in 2005 and the team was promoted back to J1 in 2006 and continued playing J1 
after that. No player from a J2 club represented Japan in international events during the period. 
Hence, this dummy variable is only included in J1. There are a total of six exogenous variables 
in J1 and five variables in J2. The detailed information on each variable is shown in Table 2.1 
and Table 2.2. 
 
2.3 The OLS Estimation and Result 
The OLS model that I use to evaluate the impact of the environment variables on efficiency 
scores for J1 and J2 is as follows:  
                                                        
                                                   
 44 
 
where  
   = Input-oriented CRS DEA efficiency score from Chapter 1 
CARDS = average number of cards per game 
GDP = Province gross domestic product 
WINRATE = win rate  
ACCESS T = Travel time to the stadium on the game day  
BC = dummy variable for whether or not the club is located in the big three Japanese metropolis 
circles 
NT = dummy variable for whether or not club players made the Japan national team  
The result of the regression for both J1 and J2 are shown in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4. As we can 
see from those tables, several independent variables are significant in both divisions. In J1, the 
coefficient on WINRATE is positive and significant, which means a higher winning percentage 
will increase the efficiency score. At least in the case of J1, the positive effect of winning 
outweighs the negative effect of higher expenses in order to achieve a higher win rate. Hence the 
general impact of the win rate in the league is to improve efficiency and bring the club closer to 
the production frontier.  
In J1, the independent variable GDP also had a positive impact on the efficiency score and is 
significant at 5% level. This situation is reversed for J2. Higher GDP leads to a lower efficiency 
score for clubs in J2. It is out of the scope of this study to explain why the result is different for 
J1 and J2. But I can try and provide some intuition. J1 clubs enjoy a high visibility in the region 
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and the fan base steadily expands with the local economy. As a result, a larger economy leads to 
higher revenue from ticket sales, advertisement or team related merchandise. On the other hand, 
J2 clubs do not have the advantage of being the most renowned teams among locals and face 
much more severe competition from other forms of sports and entertainment. In wealthier and 
better developed regions, these alternative choices are abundant, and they steal consumer 
demand from the J2 football clubs significantly. 
In J2, we have four significant independent variables. It is interesting that two of them work in 
directions opposite to those of J1. The WINRATE coefficient in J1 was positive but negative in 
J2 (significant at 1% level). As described in Chapter 1, most clubs promoted from Japan Football 
League (JFL), which is called J3, are small clubs from relatively underdeveloped areas. In J2, 
those teams built up the production frontier and most of them are on or very close to the 
production frontier. They ranked near the bottom for points awarded at the end of a season and 
they did not have an extremely large attendance. They are able to reach the production frontier 
only because each of them had very successful cost control.  
Starting in 1998, J. League changed to a pyramid structure, much like those adopted by major 
European leagues, consisting of more clubs in J2 than in J1 and more J3 clubs than in J2. During 
the years when the number of clubs in J2 was being expanded, the threat of being relegated to J3 
was very small. As a result, J2 clubs did not have the incentive to invest if it was unlikely that 
they would be promoted to J1. The exceptions were five to eight clubs who had a real potential 
to be promoted to J1. These clubs did have the incentive to invest a large amount of resources 
towards seeking promotion. All in all, however, it proved to be very expensive to win a game, 
and those J2 clubs who adopted better cost control (even if that means a lower winning rate) had 
higher efficiency. 
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As expected, increased time spent traveling to the stadium has a negative impact on the DEA 
efficiency score in J2. Intuitively, longer travel time leads to lower attendance, and lower 
attendance leads to lower efficiency for the club. 
As described in the data section, the number of cards in one game measures the impetuosity of 
the game. Although a competitive game will attract more supporters to the stadium, more 
violence and the break of continuity may lower the clubs‟ performance. In the soccer world, 
weak teams tends to make more fouls than the ones with better control of the game Our OLS 
result shows that a larger number of fouls leads to a lower efficiency score for J2 clubs. 
Finally, I present supplementary data to further illustrate the reason why the GDP coefficient is 
positive for J1 clubs but negative for J2 clubs. In areas with a higher GDP, there are other 
professional leagues like Japan Basketball League (JBL), Japan Baseball League, Japan Ice 
Hockey League, KFC, Sumo and so on. Table 2.6 shows the number of teams in alternative sport 
leagues. 
Since J1 is the most popular sport and has a dominant position in Japanese professional sports, it 
is always one of the consumers‟ first choices on game day. The existence of alternative sports 
has a limited impact on the market share of J1 teams. However, in the case of J2 it is a different 
story since all of the other professional sports, even college sports, are close alternatives to J2. A 
higher level of GDP represents a better developed area and higher sports expenditure but it also 
means J2 is unlikely to be the first choice of the public even if there is no J1 club in town. On the 
other hand, in the rural areas or small towns, clubs in J2 do not face as many alternatives. This is 
the main reason why the GDP coefficient carries opposite signs for J1 and J2 clubs.  
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2.4 Conclusion 
In this research I used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to analyze the influence of exogenous 
variables on efficiency scores derived from the input-oriented DEA model from Chapter 1.  I use 
six exogenous variables in J1 and five in J2. The result showed that in J1 a higher level of GDP 
and win rate would increase the efficiency of the club. If there is any chance to change the 
location of the club to a relatively more developed area, it is not a bad idea to do so since higher 
GDP is overall good for increasing the club‟s efficiency.  
In J2, we have four significant independent variables and two of them work in directions 
opposite to those of J1. In particular, a higher GDP and higher win rate lead to lower efficiency. 
This illustrates the importance of understanding the different market environment J2 clubs face 
as well as the key role that cost control plays in increasing J2 clubs‟ efficiency. On the other 
hand, more fouls decrease the efficiency of J2 clubs.  
In J2, if there is opportunity to change the location of the club to a better developed area, it has to 
consider the increased competition from other professional sports in the new location which 
lowers the efficiency of the club in spite of the larger population in more developed areas. It also 
has to consider the stadium‟s location relative to residential areas since travel time can 
significantly affect the supporters‟ willingness to come to the game and thus efficiency of the 
club. Finally, reducing the number of fouls enhances the game quality and increases the 
efficiency of J2 clubs.  
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Table 2.1 Data on J1 
    OBS TEAM NAME CRS WINRATE NT BC GDP ACCESS 
T 
CARDS 
1 Kashima Antlers 0.88 0.54 1.00 1.00 11.18 101.92 1.90 
2 Urawa Red Diamonds 1.00 0.51 1.00 1.00 20.96 57.45 1.91 
3 Omiya Ardija 0.97 0.32 0.00 1.00 20.96 45.42 2.15 
4 Yokohama F・Marinos 0.96 0.38 1.00 1.00 31.20 60.35 1.66 
5 Albirex Niigata 1.00 0.36 1.00 0.00 8.95 46.43 1.81 
6 Shimizu S-Pulse 0.99 0.44 1.00 0.00 16.51 66.10 1.42 
7 Jubilo Iwata 0.95 0.38 1.00 0.00 16.51 65.57 1.79 
8 Nagoya Grampus Eight 1.00 0.44 1.00 1.00 35.21 58.43 2.13 
9 Kawasaki Frontale 0.94 0.50 1.00 1.00 31.20 39.53 1.99 
10 Gamba Osaka 0.94 0.53 1.00 1.00 37.92 61.35 1.39 
11 F.C. Tokyo 0.99 0.38 1.00 1.00 90.71 51.68 1.69 
12 JEF United Ichihara Chiba 0.97 0.33 1.00 1.00 31.02 53.40 1.85 
13 Sanfrecce Hiroshima 0.88 0.37 1.00 0.00 11.57 61.40 1.69 
14 Oita Trinita 0.89 0.36 0.00 0.00 4.35 44.92 2.16 
15 Vissel Kobe 0.68 0.28 1.00 1.00 18.79 55.62 2.22 
16 Kashiwa Reysol 0.99 0.31 0.00 1.00 19.30 48.05 2.24 
17 Kyoto Sanga FC 0.77 0.22 0.00 1.00 9.85 48.00 1.85 
18 Cerezo Osaka 1.00 0.38 0.00 1.00 38.56 50.07 2.06 
19 Ventforet Kofu 1.00 0.28 0.00 0.00 3.18 36.50 2.57 
20 Tokyo Verdy 1969 0.93 0.24 0.00 1.00 89.91 58.20 2.56 
21 Montedio Yamagata 1.00 0.31 0.00 0.00 3.95 49.60 1.25 
22 Avispa Fukuoka 0.90 0.15 0.00 0.00 18.24 50.10 2.50 
23 Yokohama F.C. 0.92 0.12 0.00 1.00 31.74 52.20 1.94 
24 Vegalta Sendai 1.00 0.29 0.00 0.00 8.32 50.50 1.26 
25 Consadole Sapporo 0.86 0.12 0.00 0.00 18.06 59.60 2.38 
26 Shonan Bellmare 0.95 0.09 0.00 1.00 32.10 33.00 1.71 
  
Mean 
0.94 0.33 0.50 0.62 25.39 54.05 1.93 
  
Std 
0.08 0.12 0.51 0.50 21.92 12.84 0.37 
CRS = Efficiency Scores under the assumption of Constant Return to Scale. 
NT= Japan National Team dummy. 
BC = metropolis circle dummy. 
GDP = gross domestic production (in trillion Japanese Yen) adjusted by the inflation index. 
ACCESS T = Travel time (in minutes). 
CARDS = cards per game. 
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Table 2.2 Data on J2             
OBS TEAM NAME CRS WINRATE CARDS BC GDP ACCESS T 
1 Avispa Fukuoka 0.92 0.43 1.89 0.00 51.1 2.15 
2 Cerezo Osaka 0.91 0.54 1.48 1.00 44.97 2.16 
3 Consadole Sapporo 0.82 0.42 2.03 0.00 62.1 1.97 
4 Ehime F.C. 0.98 0.26 2.56 0.00 54.08 1.78 
5 FAGIANO OKAYAMA 1 0.18 1.89 0.00 40 1.86 
6 FC GIFU 1 0.3 1.7 1.00 40.2 1.9 
7 Giravanz Kitakyushu 1 0.03 2.16 0.00 43.3 2.22 
8 JEF United Ichihara Chiba 0.81 0.5 1.83 1.00 52.8 1.89 
9 Kashiwa Reysol 0.89 0.6 2.2 1.00 47.15 1.89 
10 Kataller Toyama 1 0.26 1.81 0.00 49.25 1.77 
11 Kyoto Sanga FC 0.98 0.59 2.15 1.00 47.9 1.7 
12 Mito HollyHock 1 0.29 2.01 1.00 47.53 2.15 
13 Montedio Yamagata 0.93 0.39 1.59 0.00 50.3 1.81 
14 Oita Trinita 1 0.28 1.97 0.00 39.6 2.03 
15 Roasso Kumamoto 1 0.31 1.99 0.00 39.43 2.03 
16 Sagan Tosu 0.92 0.42 2.15 0.00 45.78 1.88 
17 Sanfrecce Hiroshima 0.83 0.74 2.12 0.00 53.2 1.48 
18 Shonan Bellmare 0.87 0.42 1.91 1.00 36.04 1.99 
19 Thespa Kusatsu 1 0.25 1.88 1.00 41.95 2.12 
20 Tochigi SC 1 0.25 1.78 1.00 40.7 2.15 
21 Tokushima Vortis 0.95 0.25 2.03 0.00 50.43 1.91 
22 Tokyo Verdy 1969 0.65 0.46 1.9 1.00 56.05 2.2 
23 Vegalta Sendai 0.85 0.49 2.15 0.00 43.74 1.59 
24 Ventforet Kofu 1 0.47 1.77 0.00 36.05 1.83 
25 Vissel Kobe 0.63 0.52 1.86 1.00 62.3 2.56 
26 Yokohama F.C. 0.91 0.34 2.22 1.00 53.66 2.01 
  Mean  0.92 0.38 1.96 0.46 47.29 1.96 
  Std 0.10 0.15 0.21 0.50 7.06 0.22 
CRS = Efficiency Scores under the assumption of Constant Return to Scale.  
NT= Japan National Team dummy.  
BC = metropolis circle dummy. 
GDP = gross domestic product (in trillion Japanese Yen) and adjusted by the inflation index.  
ACCESS T = Travel time (in minute);  
CARDS = card per game. 
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Table 2.3 Result for J1  
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 1.012979 0.109706 9.233543 1.87E-08 0.783361 1.242597 
WINRATE 0.422132 0.165021 2.558055 0.019228 0.07674 0.767525 
NT -0.06164 0.040649 -1.51648 0.14586 -0.14672 0.023436 
GDP 0.001382 0.000759 1.821516 0.084312 -0.00021 0.002969 
ACCESS T -0.00186 0.001243 -1.49479 0.151394 -0.00446 0.000744 
CARDS -0.04642 0.040828 -1.13693 0.269705 -0.13187 0.039036 
BC -0.05046 0.033629 -1.50046 0.14993 -0.12085 0.019927 
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Table 2.4 Result for J2 
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 1.557061 0.13729 11.34139 3.66E-10 1.270679 1.843443 
WINRATE -0.31118 0.090258 -3.44771 0.002545 -0.49946 -0.12291 
BC 0.025857 0.026652 0.970162 0.343553 -0.02974 0.081452 
GDP -0.00218 0.000726 -2.99669 0.007129 -0.00369 -0.00066 
ACCESS T -0.00527 0.001703 -3.09372 0.005726 -0.00882 -0.00172 
CARDS -0.12693 0.064067 -1.98121 0.061485 -0.26057 0.006711 
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Table 2.5 Regression Statistics 
Regression Statistics J1 J2 
Multiple R 0.888316 0.656781 
R Square 0.789104 0.431361 
Adjusted R Square 0.736381 0.251791 
Standard Error 0.05345 0.062439 
Observations 26 26 
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Table 2.6 Japan Professional Leagues 
Professional League Number of Teams 
Japanese Baseball League 12 
Japan Basketball League 8 
Japan Basketball League division 2 8 
Japan Hockey League 6 
V.Premier League (Volleyball) 8 
Japan Sumo Association 105 (Membership) 
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Chapter: 3 
Measuring the Change of Total Factor Productivity in the Japan 
 Professional Football League Using the Malmquist Index 
 
3.1 Introduction  
In the first chapter, I estimated the productivity and efficiencies of the football clubs in Japan 
Professional Football League (J. League) for both the first (J1) and the second (J2) divisions.  
The methodology applied in the first chapter is a non-parametric approach, Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA), including three kinds of efficiency scores, constants returns to scale (CRS), 
variable returns to scale (VRS) and scale efficiency. This chapter is an extension of the first 
chapter, and checks the dynamic change of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) based on the 
calculation of the Malmquist Index, which consists of efficiency change and technical change 
between two time periods. In addition, the production frontier used in this chapter is built by the 
non-parametric input-oriented CRS DEA approach as applied in the first chapter. Based on the 
results of the Malmquist Index, I can clearly demonstrate the trends of the change in the TFP 
growth as increasing, declining or remaining at the same rate. This research can help us to 
understand what caused the change of TFP in each season and how they affect the final outcome 
of efficiencies in J1 and J2. In addition, the club level results can illustrate the special 
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productivity change for each club and the factors influencing the change in each season. I 
explained the relationship between the productivity change and the macroeconomic 
environmental background. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the second section is a brief review of the 
literature about Malmquist Index. The third section is about the models and the methodologies 
used in this paper including the DEA model and Malmquist Index. Section 3.4 is a description of 
the database collected from the homepage of the Japan Professional Football League. Section 3.5 
is about the results of models. The last section concludes with findings and discussions.  
 
3.2 Literature Review 
The Malmquist TFP Index was first introduced in two very influential papers by Caves, 
Christensen and Diewert (CCD) (1982a, 1982b). In these papers, CCD defined the TFP Index 
using Malmquist input and output distance functions, and thus the resulting index has come to be 
known as the Malmquist TFP index. Because of the influence and the advantages of the 
Malmquist TFP index, a large number of researchers employed this model in many fields after 
the CCD‟s introduction, for example, in agriculture (Coelli et al. (2005), Umetsu et al. (2003) 
and Guy Blaise Nkamleu (2004)), in banking (Casu et al. (2004) and Milind Sathye (2002)), and 
in retail (Barros et al. (2004)). 
Coelli et al. (2005) analyzed the TFP growth in agriculture in 93 countries from six continents 
over 20 years, from 1980 to 2000 by Malmqusit Index based on the CRS DEA efficiency scores. 
The database was collected from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nation. 
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Input variables involved in the DEA efficiency approach were land, tractor, labor, fertilizer, 
livestock and irrigation. The paper concluded that the annual TFP growth in those countries was 
2.1%. China had an average of 6.0% growth in TFP which was the highest and India had a 
growth rate of 1.4% which was the lowest. Among different regions, Asia had the highest annual 
TFP growth rate of 2.9%. 
Umetsu et al. (2003) examined the productivity change in the rice sector for the Post-Green 
Revolution era from 1971 to 1990 in the Philippines by the Malmquist TFP Index. The average 
annual Malmquist TFP growth was positive. It was negative in the early 1970s and then turned 
positive. However, the Malmquist TFP growth was negative again in the early 1980s. The 
positive change was caused by the introduction of new rice varieties and the negative impact was 
mainly because of the intensification of rice production in lowland farming systems. They also 
demonstrated the different growth between the regions in the Philippines.  
Guy Blaise Nkamleu (2004) estimates the performance of agricultural sectors in 16 African 
countries and the panel data covers 32 years from 1970 to 2001. The TFP had a positive 
evolution in those countries during the period. The decomposition of the TFP showed that the 
progress could mainly be attributed to the efficiency change rather than the technical change. He 
found a disparity of the technical efficiency and productivity among the countries in the sample 
and it was necessary to investigate the reasons for the poor performance in those less competitive 
countries and to narrow the differences.  
In the banking field, Casu et al. (2004) used both parametric (cost productivity) and non-
parametric (Malmquist TFP Index) approaches to estimate the productivity change in European 
banking during the period 1994 to 2000. The data used in this research covered more than 2000 
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European banks. By comparing the results from both methodologies, they found that the banks in 
both Italy and Spain experienced an obvious productivity growth within the period; however, the 
cases of French and German banking were mixed.  
Milind Sathye (2002) estimated the productivity change of Australian banks using the Malmquist 
Index based on the results of DEA technique during the period 1995 to 1999. The panel data 
included 17 incorporated banks in Australia. He found that technical efficiency declined but on 
average TFP still remained greater than zero during the period. Eight out of 17 banks did not 
show any positive productivity growth. He attributed the growth to deregulation in early 1980s, 
since Australia reached a stage which is called “limit of deregulation”. 
Barros et al. (2004) estimated the productivity change in a Portuguese retail store chain with 47 
retail outlets from 1999 to 2000 which was based on the DEA model on the first stage by the 
Malmquist Index. They found that the majority of the outlets were efficient but some of them 
were not. Moreover, they concluded that scale economies were the decisive factor of the 
efficiency difference.  
The Malmquist Index is also used in many other fields such as education, farm industries and 
others. Flegg et al. (2004) used the DEA model and Malmquist Index to analyze British 
universities during the period of 1980/81 to 1992/93. Thirtle et al. (1996) used a farm-level panel 
data set to analysis the Malmqusit TFP Index in the Yugoslav Republic of Slovenia. Estache et 
al. (2004) measures the change of inefficiency in Mexico‟s Port System after the reforms in 
1993. Carlos Pestana Barros (2005) analyzed a Portuguese public owned hotel chain (42 hotels). 
In the past decade, football became one of the most popular topics for research because of its 
influence in the world. Guzmán et al. (2007) estimated the efficiency of the football clubs in the 
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English Premier League by Malmquist TFP Index based on the DEA efficiency scores as well as 
canonical correlation theory. Six years were covered by the data, from 1997/98 to 2002/03. 
Based on the result of the Malmquist TFP Index, most clubs experienced a negative productivity 
growth since they had a value of TFP score less than one.  
Isidoro Guzmán (2006) measured the efficiency and sustainable growth in Spain football teams 
(first division) by the data collected from 2000/01 to 2002/03. After the first step, application of 
DEA model, the dynamic change of the TFP was caught by the Malmquist Index. He then 
estimated the sustainable growth of the clubs in this sample. In conclusion, he claimed that the 
mean value of the Malmquist Index was about one and found that “technological change reveals 
a negative displacement of the efficiency frontiers during the periods evaluated, whereas the 
change in technical efficiency is trending positively, suggesting the clubs provide better 
performance in terms of movements with respect to the efficiency frontiers over the assessed 
seasons.” (p.283) There were two teams, Sevilla and Real Club Deportivo de la Coruna which 
made their way closer to the frontier, since both of them showed an obvious positive growth of 
productivity, which could not be attributed to the technical efficiency change. They only 
experienced a very limited technological change because of the scarce adoption of the new 
teaching technologies by best-practice teams.  
Espitia-Escuer et al. (2008) also analyzed the first division of the Spain Football League from 
1998 to 2004 by the Mamlquist TFP Index based on the DEA efficiency scores. In the season 
1998/99 and 2001/02, the league experienced a decrease in TFP which could be attributed to 
technical decline. And in the season 2000/01 the decline in the TFP was caused by the fall of 
efficiency. Both season 2002/03 and 2003/04 had a positive TFP growth; growth in 2002/03 was 
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due to technical increase; and growth in 2003/04 is attributed to both technical progress and 
efficiency. 
 
3.3 DEA and Malmquist TFP Index 
Data Envelopment Analysis 
The production frontier used in this research has given rise to the methodology of a non- 
parametric estimator, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The variables used here are the same 
as those used in the first chapter: points awarded, revenue and attendance on the output side and 
payroll, other cost besides the payroll and total assets on the input side. The structure of the DEA 
model is described below: 
                
∑      
 
   
∑      
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∑      
 
   
∑      
 
   
                              
                                                                            
                                                                               
   is the efficiency of      ;     and     are the observed outputs and inputs values, 
respectively, of     , and    and    are the weights assigned to output r and input i during the 
aggregation. Each DMU represents one of the 26 football clubs in J1 or J2. Detailed information 
about the DEA model is showed in Section 1.4 which is the same model as the one used in this 
chapter. 
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Malmquist Total Factor Productivity (TFP) Index 
In order to estimate the productivity change between two time periods, I use the Malmquist 
Index of the change in Total Factor Productivity.  The TFP is a measure of the change of 
productivity for the DMU producing multiple outputs using multiple inputs. The Malmquist TFP 
Index is based on the measurement of the radial distance of the observed inputs and outputs 
between two time periods according to a reference technology. The distance function is 
calculated by using input-oriented CRS (constant returns to scale) DEA model in this research. 
In addition, I applied the input-oriented Malmquist TFP Index. The definition of input-oriented 
productivity is to measure the minimum level of usage of the inputs given a certain amount of 
output and a production technology relative to the collected observation set.  
 
The following model is reproduced from Coelli, Timothy J., D.S. Prasada Rao, Christopher J. 
O‟Donnell and George E. Battese (2005). 
The Malmquist TFP index measures the TFP change between two data points by 
calculating the ratio of the distances of each data point relative to a common 
technology. If the period t technology is used as the reference technology, the 
Malmquist TFP change index between period s (the base period) and period t is 
can be write as  
  
               
  
        
  
        
 
Alternative, if the s reference technology is used it is defined as  
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Note that in the above equations the notations   
         represents the distance 
from period t observation to the period s technology. A  value of    greater than 
one indicates positive TFP growth from period s to period t while a value less 
than one indicates a TFP decline. 
The Malmquist  TFP index is ofren defined as the geometric mean of these tweo 
indices, in the spirit of Fisher (1922) and Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982b). 
That is  
                 
  
        
  
        
 
  
        
  
        
 
 
  
The distance functions in this productivity index can be rearranged to show that it 
is equivalent to the product of a technical efficiency change index and an index of 
technical change 
                
  
        
  
        
 
  
        
  
        
 
  
        
  
        
 
 
  
Those two terms are: 
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As mentioned above, these distance functions can be calculated by the input-oriented CRS DEA 
efficiency scores. From the formula of the technical change, we can see that it consists of two 
efficiency ratios with respect to the isoquants in t and s. In the meantime, the value of the ratios 
in some units can be demonstrated to increase or decrease in comparison to other units (football 
clubs) in a given period and a given sample.  
When considering the productivity change from period t to period t+1and then also the change 
from t+1 to t+2, the productivity indices can be chained to a comparison between period t and 
t+2. However, it cannot be denoted in the way below: 
 
                                      
 
This is mainly because of the nature of the production technology. From the Malmquist TFP 
Index, I can see that the first component, change of Technical Efficiency, can be transitive, but 
the second term cannot be transitive unless the technology change is neutral.  
 
3.4 Data 
The data used in this research is collected from the official site of the Japan Professional Football 
League (J. League) including the first and the second division (J1 and J2). It covers five seasons 
from 2006 to 2010. The general financial reports for each club every year are published on the 
official website in the middle of the next year. Different from the data set used in Chapter 1, it 
only covers five years since several football clubs‟ payroll information in both J1 and J2 is not 
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available in 2005. The Malmquist Index is calculated by using the input-oriented DEA approach. 
In order to obtain meaningful and accurate DEA scores for both divisions in each year, this data 
set includes all of the clubs that played in one or more seasons during the period. In order to meet 
the requirement of the Malmquist TFP Index, the football club has to play in two consecutive 
seasons during the period; otherwise the Malmquist TFP Index cannot be computed. As a result, 
there are a total of 19 football clubs in each division for which a Malmquist TFP Index could be 
computed in at least one year.  
In general, there are a total of 36 clubs, both in J1 and J2, presented during the period. Eleven 
clubs in J1 and five clubs in J2 played in all five seasons. The detailed information about 
individual club‟s participation in J1 or J2 is shown in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. There are three 
input variables and three output variables involved in the DEA model which are the same as in 
the first chapter: payroll, cost besides the payroll, total assets on the input side; annual revenue, 
points awarded and attendance on the output side. Data on these variables are presented in Table 
3.3 and Table 3.4. The detailed reasons why I choose those variables as the ones involved in the 
production are explained in the data section in Chapter 1.  
 
3.5 Result 
In the first step, I calculated the input-oriented DEA efficiency scores of each club in each year 
during the period using both constant returns to scale (CRS) and variable returns to scale (VRS). 
Results are presented in Table 3.5 and Table 3.6. In J1, Albirex Niigata was the only club with an 
efficiency score of one in both CRS and VRS through the whole period. Ventforet Kofu and 
Montedio Yamagata, which attended two seasons each in J1, were also efficient in CRS and 
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VRS. This is mainly because Albirex Niigata had the largest attendance in every year with 
relatively moderate inputs compared to other clubs. Ventforet Kofu and Montedio Yamagata had 
the smallest amount of inputs in the seasons they played although they did not have any 
extraordinary outcomes. Kyoto Sanga FC in 2006 had the lowest efficiency score, 0.7482, 
among all of the clubs from 2006 to 2010, which is far below the average value because of its 
weak performance, especially the points awarded. Kawasaki Frontale, Vissel Kobe, Sanfrecce 
Hiroshima and Kyoto Sanga FC all played J1 in at least four seasons during the period. However, 
none of them reached the production frontier (CRS) based on their inefficient operations.  
Four clubs, Montedio Yamagata, Mito HollyHock, FC Gifu and Roasso Kumamoto, played three 
seasons or more in J2 and all of them had efficient DEA scores in the season they played. Mito 
HollyHock, FC Gifu and Roasso Kumamoto did not lead any output position. Their efficiencies 
were all based on successful cost control. Montedio Yamagata had efficient cost control, ranked 
the second in points awarded at the end of season 2008 and was promoted to J1 in season 2009.  
So I can conclude that Montedio Yamagata was the most efficiently organized club according to 
the effects from both input and output side in J2. Yokohama F.C., Shonan Bellmare, Avispa 
Fukuoka, Tokyo Verdy 1969 and Cerezo Osaka played J2 three seasons or more, but none of 
those clubs had ever reached the production frontier (CRS) during the period. This is mainly 
because they had the motivation and possibility to promote to J1. They all successfully 
experienced playing J1 during the period.  
After promotion to J1, revenue can be increased in several ways. More attention and concerns 
will be given to the top division games. For example, more live TV on the mainstream channels 
and a larger share of newspaper coverage. If they promote to J1, they get better opportunities for 
exposure and then subsequent gains. Based on the value of promotion, J2 clubs could increase 
 65 
 
input use temporarily, earn promotion and then receive a relatively large payoff after joining J1. 
This is experienced by Tokyo Verdy 1969.  
In general, the average value of DEA efficiency scores experienced an increase from 2006 to 
2007 as shown in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2. In the case of J1, the range of fluctuation was 
relatively narrow, between 0.94 and 0.98, during the period. Especially after 2007 the range was 
from 0.957 to 0.963 which means that the efficiencies were very stable and the change is 
gradual. On the other hand, the VRS efficiency score is even more stable. In J2 the range was 
much wider than in J1, between 0.887 and 0.975 in CRS and 0.946 and 0.992 in VRS. It shows 
that the CRS efficiencies in J2 were unstable and the change was more intense compared to J1. 
This is because the number of clubs was changing all the time as new clubs kept joining J2. The 
decline of efficiencies in 2009 can be attributed to the performance of Tokyo Verdy 1969 which 
had the lowest efficiency in J2. The average value without Tokyo Verdy 1969 was nearly 0.95 
which was very close to the ones in 2008 and 2010.  So we can say that the wider range of CRS 
efficieny scores in J2 was caused by the outlier clubs Tokyo Verdy 1969 in 2009 and Vissel 
Kobe in 2006 which were very inefficient. 
The Malmquist Indexes of TFP for each club in each season are presented in Table 3.7 and Table 
3.8 from 2007 to 2010, where each year is compared to the previous year. There were four 
groups of comparison in J1 and J2. As most researchers did in their papers, technical efficiency 
is based on the input-oriented CRS DEA approach. From Table 3.7, we can see that the average 
Malmquist Index values in J1 are less than one through the period. This means that the first 
division of J. League experienced a decline of total factor productivity year by year although the 
speed of decline is different every year. The lowest value, 0.8511, happened at United Ichihara 
Chiba in 2009. After the decomposition of the Malmquist Index to the efficiency change and the 
 66 
 
technical change in J1, we see that there was an increase in efficiency in 2007 and then J1 
experienced a consistent efficiency decline from 2008 to 2010. Conversely, 2007 showed a 
decline in technology but the technical change was positive after 2007. There is no year with 
both positive technical and positive efficiency changes in the first division of J. League during 
the period of analysis. As described in Espitia-Escuer et al. (2008), when the average Malmquist 
Index values are close to one and the technical and efficiency changes move in opposite 
directions, no component dominated in the total factor productivity variations.  
However, at the club level it can be a different story from the general results of J1. First of all, 
most clubs did not realize TFP changes in the same directions. There were two exceptions: 
Sanfrecce Hiroshima and Vissel Kobe. Sanfrecce Hiroshima showed a negative TFP change in 
the Malmqusit Index in 2007 and 2010; the decline in 2007 was due to both the decline in 
efficiency and a technology decline. In 2010, it was only due to the decline in efficiency. In the 
case of Vissel Kobe, it had a positive TFP change in the Malmquist Index for three consecutive 
seasons. The result showed that Vissel Kobe achieved technical progress from 2007 to 2010 and 
experienced an improvement in efficiency only in year 2008. Second, similar to the results in 
Coelli et al. (2005) and Barros et al. (2003), several clubs in each season had a value of the 
Malmquist Index equal to one. There were six such clubs in 2007 and three clubs in 2008. This is 
because those clubs were efficient in consecutive seasons even after switching the values of 
components in the Technical Efficiency function as   
         and   
        . In this situation, 
the club will be efficient in both periods anyway. As a result,   
            
             
         
and   
          are all equal to one as well as the Malmquist Index. These clubs reached the 
production frontier in both seasons and were the most efficient. Albirex Niigata had a value of 
the Malmquist Index equal to one in all seasons because of highest attendance in each season and 
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relatively successful cost control. That the value of the Malmquist Index remains equal to one 
does not mean that the clubs do not improve efficiency and promote new technologies. It shows 
that the clubs are already on the production frontier and remain there.   
In addition, I checked the values of the Malmquist Index for the clubs relegated from J1 to J2. 
Five clubs met the condition that they played at least two consecutive seasons before the 
relegation from J1, JEF United Ichihara Chiba (relegated in 2009), Oita Trinita (2009), Sanfrecce 
Hiroshima (2007), Ventforet Kofu (2007) and Kashiwa Reysol (2009). United Ichihara Chiba, 
Oita Trinita and Sanfrecce Hiroshima all experienced a TFP decline in the relegation season 
which can be attributed to the low points awarded in the season. United Ichihara Chiba had a 
Malmquist Index value of 0.8511. In the case of Ventforet Kofu and Kashiwa Reysol, they were 
still efficient in the relegation year although they received limited points because of successful 
cost control.  
In 2007, four clubs achieved a Malmquist Index with value more than one: Kashima Antlers, 
Yokohama F. Marinos, Nagoya Grampus Eight and F.C. Tokyo. All of their TFP growth can be 
attributed to an improvement in efficiency although they all experienced a technical decline. In 
2008, six clubs with the Malmquist Index more than one had different component combinations. 
The TFP growth of Omiya Ardija and Yokohama F. Marinos were due to the improvement in 
efficiency and Kashiwa Reysol, Gamba Osaka and Vissel Kobe were due to the technical 
progress. Only the TFP growth of Kawasaki Frontale is because of both positive changes in 
efficiency and technology. In 2009, six clubs achieved positive growth in TFP. Three clubs 
(Omiya Ardija, Jubilo Iwata, Gamba Osaka) can be explained by the improvement of efficiency 
and F.C. Tokyo by technical progress. Moreover, the TFP growth of Vissel Kobe and Shimizu S-
Pulse were caused by positive efficiency and technology changes. In 2010, there were five clubs 
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with a growth in TFP. Three clubs (Nagoya Grampus Eight, Vissel Kobe, Kyoto Sanga FC) were 
due to the technical progress. F.C. Tokyo was due to efficiency increase. Jubilo Iwata was 
because of both positive changes in efficiency and technology.  
The Malmquist Index of J2 clubs is shown in Table 3.8. I found TFP growth in 2007, 2009 and 
2010 when average values were more than one. The positive change of average Malmquist Index 
values in 2009 and 2010 can be attributed to technical progress and in 2007 was caused by the 
improvement of efficiency. On the other hand, the decline of the Malmquist Index in 2008 can be 
explained by both a negative change in efficiency and technology. At the club level, the lowest 
value in J2 was 0.8755, Shonan Bellmare in 2007. This was moderately higher than the lowest 
value in J1. Only 2 clubs had the Malmquist Index moving in the same direction; Tokyo Verdy 
1969 had positive productivity growth in 2007 and 2010 and the Malmquist Index was 1.8071 in 
2010, which is the highest value in J2 and J1. This is mainly because Tokyo Verdy 1969 had an 
extremely dramatic cost reduction in 2010 compared to 2009. Conversely, Cerezo Osaka had a 
decline trend in TFP in 2008 and 2009. Several clubs in J2 each year had a Malmquist Index 
equal to one. There were three clubs each in 2007 and 2010 and one club each in 2008 and 2009 
that had Malmquist TFP equal to one. Among those clubs, Montedio Yamagata played three 
seasons in J2 and all of its TFP values were equal to one, because of its efficient and successful 
cost control during the seasons.  
There were six clubs promoted to J1 from J2 during the period and I checked the Malmquist 
Index of the last year in J2 before the promotion. Consadole Sapporo (promotion decided in 
2008), Shonan Bellmare (2009) and Tokyo Verdy 1969 (2007) had positive TFP growth, which 
can be attributed to their leading positions in the athletic rank at the end of season. Montedio 
Yamagata was an efficient club in any time and any formation.  
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In 2007, four clubs had positive TFP growth. Tokyo Verdy 1969 and Shonan Bellmare were 
caused by positive changes in both technology and efficiency. TFP growths for Consadole 
Sapporo and Vegalta Sendai were the result of improvement in efficiency only. In 2008, three 
clubs had positive TFP growth. Sagan Tosu had positive change from both efficiency and 
technology progress. Tokushima Vortis achieved efficiency improvement and Mito HollyHock 
was the result of technical progress. In 2009, five clubs realized positive growth in TFP 
(Yokohama F.C., Shonan Bellmare, Ventforet Kofu, FC Gifu, Roasso Kumamoto). This was due 
to a change in both efficiency and technical progress. The TFP growths of Tokushima Vortis and 
Ehime F.C. were the result of technical progress. In 2010, all five clubs with increased TFP 
(Tokushima Vortis, Avispa Fukuoka, Sagan Tosu, Tokyo Verdy 1969, Tochigi SC) were due to 
the efficiency improvement. 
In sum, the Malmquist Index in J1 had a downward trend as shown in Figure 3.3. This means 
that the TFP was consistently decreasing through the period. In J2, the situation was more 
complicated. In the case of J1, the decreasing trend can be attributed to movement of the 
production frontier which decreased in 2007 compared to 2006 and then kept increasing after 
2007. Some clubs who were inefficient in 2006 (Omiya Ardija, Kawasaki Frontale, Gamba 
Osaka, F.C. Tokyo, Sanfrecce Hiroshima) became efficient after switching their components to 
2007,    
                   and all of the other inefficient clubs in 2006 received higher 
efficiency after this switch. Conversely, some clubs (Kashima Antlers, Shimizu S-Pulse, Gamba 
Osaka, Oita Trinita) who were efficient in 2007 were inefficient after switching the components 
from 2007 to 2006,   
                 . Moreover, clubs such as Urawa Red Diamonds, Albirex 
Niigata, JEF United Ichihara Chiba and Ventforet Kofu were efficient before and after the 
switch. This means that clubs in 2006 had a higher (or at least equal in certain dimensions), 
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production frontier than clubs in 2007 and the efficient clubs in 2006 were more efficient than 
(or at least equal to) the efficient clubs in 2007. After this decline in 2007, the production frontier 
kept increasing as the technical changes are greater than one after that. Clubs‟ efficiencies in 
2006 were very low although they had a relatively higher production frontier. This is because the 
inefficient clubs had positions relatively far from the frontier. On the other hand, clubs in 2007 
had extremely high efficiencies due to their relatively short distances to the frontier. So, from 
2006 to 2007 J1 experienced an improvement of efficiency. Although the production frontier 
increased after 2007, the efficiency of inefficient clubs remained the same, declined or at least 
did not improve as much as the ones already on the production frontier achieved. As a result, the 
efficiency changes in J1 were consistently less than one after 2007. In general, the negative 
impact of technology decline overcame the positive impact of efficiency improvement in 2007; 
the negative impact of efficiency overcame the positive impact of technical progress after 2007. 
Hence, the trend of the Malmquist Index in J1 was decreasing during in the entire period.  
In J2, there was no clear trend. First, the size of J2 kept expanding through the period, so the 
number of clubs was different year after year. According to the expansion plan, there was no 
relegation to the JFL (the Japan Football League, also called J3). Most of the new clubs 
promoted from JFL were smaller clubs and from relatively and economically underdeveloped 
areas. Hence, those clubs did not have the incentive and capability to promote to J1 right away 
and there was no threat to be relegated back to JFL. The new J2 clubs, Giravanz Kitakyushu 
(2010), Kataller Toyama (2009), Fagiano Okayama (2009), FC Gifu (2008) and Roasso 
Kumamoto (2008) were running at extremely low cost. All of these clubs were efficient with 
CRS efficiency score equal to one in the first year of play in J2 due to the successful cost control. 
Some dimensions of the production frontier were determined by the new clubs from JFL. 
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Secondly, three clubs (two in 2008) were relegated from J1 into J2 and the top three clubs (two 
in 2008) in the points rank promoted to J1 every year. This mechanism made the composition of 
J2 unstable and unpredictable. New clubs from J1 or JFL can change the production frontier in 
J2 as Oita Trinita (2009) noted. Therefore, the technical change fluctuation through the period is 
understandable since the production frontier kept changing as the new clubs were relegated from 
J1 and promoted from JFL. The production frontier‟s position was different and the composition 
and structure of J2 was also changing every year. For this reason the result shown in Table 3.8, 
where no clear trend of the Malmquist Index in J2 occurs, is understandable. 
 
3.6 Conclusion and Discussion 
This research has analyzed the dynamic change in Total Factor Productivity of the first and 
second divisions in the Japan Professional Football League between 2006 and 2010. The method 
used in this analysis employs the Malmquist Index based on the efficiency values calculated by 
the non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Then the Malmquist Index is 
decomposed to the technical change and the efficiency change and the results are explained. 
Input-oriented DEA efficiency scores of J1 and J2 are calculated in both constant and variable 
returns to scale. The results showed that the most efficient clubs were Albirex Niigata, Ventforet 
Kofu and Montedio Yamagata, which were on the production frontier under both CRS and VRS, 
in all of the seasons they played in J1. Albirex Niigata‟s efficiency was due to the large amount 
of attendees and the other two clubs were due to successful cost control. Some clubs, for instance 
Sanfrecce Hiroshima and Kyoto Sanga FC, never reached the production frontier under CRS. In 
the case of J2, Montedio Yamagata, Mito HollyHock, FC Gifu and Roasso Kumamoto 
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consistently stayed on the production frontier in the years they played in J2.  Montedio Yamagata 
had very good athletic performance and cost control even in the season they were promoted to J1, 
the others were on the top because of efficient cost control. Some clubs in J2 wanted to promote 
to J1 because of the greater return. Except for Montedio Yamagata, other clubs which did 
promote to J1 were not on the production frontier due to the large amount of resources inputted 
to secure the promotion. As a whole, the average value of CRS DEA efficiency scores had a 
sharp increase from the lowest value in 2006 and then a decrease after 2007 in J1. After 2007, 
the scores fluctuated in a relatively narrow range and the changes were very small. In J2, the 
CRS DEA efficiency scores were unstable. The range was much wider than J1 and there was 
more than one direction during the period. One cause of the low value of  average CRS DEA 
scores in 2006 and 2009 was the outlier clubs, Tokyo Verdy 1969 (2009) and Vissel Kobe 
(2006), which had extremely inefficient performance. 
There are four calculation of the Malmquist Index during the period in each division based on the 
input-oriented CRS DEA efficiency approach. The TFP of J1 was consistently decreasing. The 
decomposition of the Malmquist Index into the technical change and the efficiency change 
revealed the decline of technology in 2007 and then the technical progress after 2007. After the 
decline of efficiency in 2007, it kept increasing from 2008 to the end of the period. At the club 
level, only Sanfrecce Hiroshima and Vissel Kobe had the change of productivity in the same 
direction, one downward and one upward. Moreover, some clubs, such as Montedio Yamagata, 
had a Malmquist Index equal to one since the clubs were efficient in two consecutive seasons 
and would be efficient even after switching the components of each other season (    
         
and   
        ). Those clubs stayed on the production frontier between two consecutive seasons 
anyway. Among the clubs who experienced relegation to J2 from J1, some of them experienced a 
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productivity decline in the relegation season which can be attributed to the low points awarded in 
the season. However, Ventforet Kofu and Kashiwa Reysol were still efficient in the relegation 
year due to the successful cost control even though each received limited points. In J2, the TFP 
grew in 2007, 2009 and 2010.  The growths were caused by the technical progress in 2009 and 
2010 and by the improvement of efficiency in 2007. The negative change of Malmquist Index in 
2008 was due to decline of both efficiency and technology. At the club level, Tokyo Verdy 1969 
increased productivity in 2007 and 2010, (the seasons played) and Cerezo Osaka had a decline in 
TFP in 2007 and 2008, (the seasons played). Several J2 clubs were constantly on the production 
frontier even after the switch of the components to those of another season. The TFP was 
decreasing through the period, but the reasons that caused this phenomenon were different. The 
decrease from 2006 to 2007 was because the production frontier decreased which means that the 
efficient clubs in 2006 were more efficient than the efficient ones in 2007. The average value of 
  
                  was higher than the value of   
                  and this revealed that the 
decline of TFP was caused by the decline of efficiency of the efficient clubs in 2007 compared to 
2006 as shown in Table 3.9. This can be attributed to the clubs on the production frontier in 2007 
(Kashima Antlers, Shimizu S-Pulse, Gamba Osaka and Oita Trinita) spending more to achieve a 
certain level of outcome than the efficient ones in 2006. The decline of TFP after 2007 was due 
to decreasing efficiency although the production frontier kept improving after 2007. The 
production frontier improvement from 2007 to 2008 was due to the increase in revenue of the 
clubs although the cost also increased in the same year. This is shown in the Figure 3.4. The 
revenue of the clubs kept increasing before the global financial crisis in 2008. The clubs on the 
frontier gained more from increase in revenue than the loss from an increase in cost. This made 
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clubs on the frontier more efficient than the ones on the frontier the year before. Conversely, the 
improvement of production frontier from 2008 to 2010 was purely due to cost control.  
The revenue of the clubs was obviously declining, since the Japanese economy experienced a 
serious financial crisis in 2008. From 2008 to 2010, although losing part of its revenue, clubs on 
the frontier successfully cut their cost and made them more efficient year after year. On the other 
hand, most of the inefficient clubs did not improve as much as the ones on the frontier did, and in 
some case even did worse. As a result, the efficiency change was decreasing through the period 
despite the improvement of the production frontier. 
There is no obvious trend we can see in the case of J2.  And this is mainly because the number of 
clubs kept changing all the time. The new clubs promoted from JFL were all smaller ones and 
from less developed areas. So they usually input extremely limited resource in the first year since 
there was no relegation from J2 and they could not hope to promote to J1 based on their 
capability and experience. Those new clubs made the frontier every year so the change of the 
production frontier depends on the new clubs performance in cost control. Moreover, besides 
those new clubs from JFL, there are three clubs relegated from J2 to J1 and three new clubs 
joined J2 from J1 each year. Sometimes, the new clubs would position the frontier by its 
performance. So there were so many uncertain factors which influence the composition and 
structure of the production frontier in J2. Hence, the fluctuated change of TFP is understandable.  
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Figure 3.1 Average Efficiency Levels in J1 
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Figure 3.2 Average Efficiency Levels in J2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.88
0.9
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
CRS
VRS
 77 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Malmquist Index Trends in J1 and J2 
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Figure 3.4 Average Revenue and Cost in J. League 
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Table 3.1 J1 Malmquist TFP Index Database 
 
OBS Club Name 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Years of 
Play 
1 Kashima Antlers J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 5 
2 Urawa Red Diamonds J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 5 
3 Omiya Ardija J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 5 
4 Yokohama F・Marinos J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 5 
5 Albirex Niigata J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 5 
6 Shimizu S-Pulse J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 5 
7 Jubilo Iwata J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 5 
8 Nagoya Grampus Eight J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 5 
9 Kawasaki Frontale J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 5 
10 Gamba Osaka J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 5 
11 F.C. Tokyo J1 J1 J1 J1 J1 5 
12 JEF United Ichihara Chiba J1 J1 J1 J1 
 
4 
13 Sanfrecce Hiroshima J1 J1 
 
J1 J1 4 
14 Oita Trinita J1 J1 J1 J1 
 
4 
15 Vissel Kobe 
 
J1 J1 J1 J1 4 
16 Kashiwa Reysol 
 
J1 J1 J1 
 
3 
17 Kyoto Sanga FC 
  
J1 J1 J1 3 
18 Ventforet Kofu J1 J1 
   
2 
19 Montedio Yamagata 
   
J1 J1 2 
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Table 3.2  J2 Malmquist TFP Index Database 
    
OBS Club Name 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Years of 
Play 
1 Cerezo Osaka 
 
J2 J2 J2 
 
3 
2 Ventforet Kofu 
  
J2 J2 J2 3 
3 Tokyo Verdy 1969 J2 J2 
 
J2 J2 4 
4 Montedio Yamagata J2 J2 J2 
  
3 
5 Avispa Fukuoka 
 
J2 J2 J2 J2 4 
6 Yokohama F.C. 
  
J2 J2 J2 3 
7 Vegalta Sendai J2 J2 J2 J2 
 
4 
8 Consadole Sapporo J2 J2 
 
J2 J2 4 
9 Shonan Bellmare J2 J2 J2 J2 
 
4 
10 Mito HollyHock J2 J2 J2 J2 J2 5 
11 Thespa Kusatsu J2 J2 J2 J2 J2 5 
12 Tokushima Vortis J2 J2 J2 J2 J2 5 
13 Sagan Tosu J2 J2 J2 J2 J2 5 
14 Ehime F.C. J2 J2 J2 J2 J2 5 
15 Roasso Kumamoto 
  
J2 J2 J2 3 
16 FC Gifu     J2 J2 J2 3 
17 Tochigi SC 
   
J2 J2 2 
18 Kataller Toyama 
   
J2 J2 2 
19 Fagiano Okayama 
   
J2 J2 2 
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Table 3.3 Yearly Input and Output Data in J1                         
    2006(18) 2007(18) 2008(18) 
OBS Team Name Poi Attend Reve Payro O C T A Poi Attend Reve Payro O C T A Poi Attend Reve Payro O C T A 
1 Kashima Antlers 58 262365 3381 1564 3536 1885 72 276058 3983 1736 3805 2337 63 335140 4180 1850 4063 2387 
2 Urawa Red Diamonds 72 774749 7078 2499 6855 2240 70 793347 7964 2841 7744 2262 52 809353 7091 2406 7057 2116 
3 Omiya Ardija 44 173986 2376 1246 2518 612 35 194912 2842 1384 2840 1044 43 158944 3059 1565 3046 1015 
4 Yokohama F・Marinos 45 402270 4559 2210 4508 2462 50 408656 4909 1961 4674 2425 48 402593 4092 1290 4089 1426 
5 Albirex Niigata 42 658050 2793 1248 2857 1304 51 650698 2661 1374 2953 1145 42 586325 2590 1208 2720 1043 
6 Shimizu S-Pulse 60 243137 2986 1139 2978 912 61 271180 3180 1263 3166 1105 55 282190 3457 1484 3451 1241 
7 Jubilo Iwata 58 306033 3717 1869 3939 956 49 278109 3594 1575 3515 1158 37 262911 3387 1657 3659 1343 
8 Nagoya Grampus Eight 48 253702 3801 2313 4093 834 45 264939 3635 1770 3592 764 59 281442 4071 2005 3971 873 
9 Kawasaki Frontale 67 243780 2780 1535 2765 996 54 294751 3105 1639 3096 1104 60 298597 3320 1743 3250 1075 
10 Gamba Osaka 66 276395 3361 1623 3118 1281 67 296465 3212 1927 3304 1216 50 274169 4399 2304 4137 1255 
11 F.C. Tokyo 43 409634 3299 1612 3355 883 45 429934 3347 1680 3581 703 55 437176 3433 1570 3562 833 
12 JEF United Ichihara Chiba 44 227680 2887 1436 2752 751 42 240535 3112 1310 2692 1041 38 239436 3564 1612 3174 992 
13 Sanfrecce Hiroshima 45 190066 2267 1414 2765 610 32 194199 2626 1236 2567 1088             
14 Oita Trinita 47 345955 1800 754 1892 1185 41 335896 2261 1283 2172 1047 56 345481 2184 1299 2177 754 
15 Vissel Kobe             47 211822 1865 1317 2422 1012 47 220672 2026 1369 2505 829 
16 Kashiwa Reysol             50 220442 3143 1693 3105 758 46 209229 2997 1694 3048 553 
17 Kyoto Sanga FC 22 166280 2230 1072 3476 926             41 232671 2502 1334 2505 1577 
18 Cerezo Osaka 27 221438 2108 1150 2318 314                         
19 Ventforet Kofu 42 207629 1343 556 1102 553 27 233476 1655 741 1506 566             
20 Montedio Yamagata                                     
21 Tokyo Verdy 1969                         37 252231 4144 2622 4134 1844 
22 Avispa Fukuoka 27 234259 1575 778 1682 558                         
23 Yokohama F.C.             16 238662 1706 862 1861 474             
24 Vegalta Sendai                                     
25 Consadole Sapporo                         18 247305 1618 787 1770 1196 
26 Shonan Bellmare                                     
Poi = Points Awarded; Attend = Attendance; Reve = Revenue; Payro = Payroll; OC = Other Cost; TA = Total Assets             
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Table 3.3 (Continued)             
    2009(18) 2010(18) 
OBS Team Name Poi Attend Reve Payro O C T A Poi Attend Reve Payro O C T A 
1 Kashima Antlers 66 367486 4408 1913 4303 2471 60 356430 4466 2004 4449 2561 
2 Urawa Red Diamonds 52 751565 6432 2464 6358 1890 48 678994 5625 2282 5898 1450 
3 Omiya Ardija 39 233013 3553 1954 3546 661 42 188088 3308 1850 3290 441 
4 Yokohama F・Marinos 46 374975 3505 1165 3505 739 51 436624 3565 1374 3905 719 
5 Albirex Niigata 50 568582 2418 1038 2470 1007 49 519221 2216 910 2341 897 
6 Shimizu S-Pulse 51 304900 3514 1378 3378 1062 54 306022 3486 1498 3567 962 
7 Jubilo Iwata 41 229891 3422 1582 3395 1011 44 206324 3151 1254 2901 948 
8 Nagoya Grampus Eight 50 270773 4506 2350 4485 1072 72 339638 4103 2133 4198 797 
9 Kawasaki Frontale 64 320394 3604 1951 3543 1097 54 315550 3540 1743 3493 1039 
10 Gamba Osaka 60 301105 4078 2215 3939 1188 62 283111 3346 1773 3380 1037 
11 F.C. Tokyo 53 440032 3763 1768 3731 951 36 426899 3671 1370 3274 1349 
12 JEF United Ichihara Chiba 27 250413 2683 1552 3036 1519             
13 Sanfrecce Hiroshima 56 267299 2728 1313 2708 786 51 247550 2605 1372 2853 977 
14 Oita Trinita 30 313281 1915 1345 2242 543             
15 Vissel Kobe 39 222153 2446 1545 2722 1441 38 218004 2035 1167 2275 913 
16 Kashiwa Reysol 34 199552 2859 1580 2930 466             
17 Kyoto Sanga FC 41 189149 2416 1503 2596 1154 19 178673 2311 1308 2416 1269 
18 Cerezo Osaka             61 255439 2554 1301 2528 724 
19 Ventforet Kofu                         
20 Montedio Yamagata 39 204953 1163 569 1136 286 42 199069 1229 787 1302 191 
21 Tokyo Verdy 1969                         
22 Avispa Fukuoka                         
23 Yokohama F.C.                         
24 Vegalta Sendai             39 294644 2041 858 1863 1152 
25 Consadole Sapporo                         
26 Shonan Bellmare             16 188614 1288 646 1342 354 
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Table 3.4 Yearly Input and Output Data in J2                 
    2006(13) 2007(13) 2008(15) 
OBS Team Name Poi Attend Reve Payro O C T A Poi Attend Reve Payro O C 
T 
A Poi Attend Reve Payro O C 
T 
A 
1 Consadole Sapporo 72 251476 1177 607 1527 983 91 290676 1255 537 1442 983             
2 Vegalta Sendai 77 346868 1609 792 1685 902 83 352432 1543 732 1601 777 70 295679 1421 606 1467 873 
3 Montedio Yamagata 65 122042 665 393 657 179 58 101836 539 251 510 163 78 131725 626 392 716 173 
4 Mito HollyHock 51 72405 341 141 338 124 34 57957 301 140 337 112 47 63933 349 159 361 116 
5 Thespa Kusatsu 42 89670 586 162 535 116 42 91401 553 184 525 83 53 88510 544 196 528 98 
6 Yokohama F.C. 93 122852 1195 523 1197 442             50 142655 1164 461 1292 306 
7 Shonan Bellmare 49 128766 709 425 855 233 77 112254 970 504 970 288 65 125865 930 542 1062 392 
8 Ventforet Kofu                         59 217428 1263 587 1236 506 
9 Tokushima Vortis 35 83452 636 220 620 496 33 78936 634 334 674 446 29 81093 638 280 651 456 
10 Avispa Fukuoka             73 228702 1421 610 1385 439 58 211651 1157 559 1209 437 
11 Sagan Tosu 79 179151 705 376 821 312 72 146731 572 377 775 201 64 152486 702 317 695 215 
12 Kashiwa Reysol 88 199872 3244 2188 3462 756                         
13 Tokyo Verdy 1969 71 136926 2143 1546 3015 591 89 175850 2672 1290 2662 669             
14 Ehime F.C. 53 99334 435 163 431 257 45 79619 466 185 466 241 37 77775 492 191 491 240 
15 Cerezo Osaka             80 159044 2066 889 2045 486 69 221629 1940 824 1999 543 
16 FC Gifu                         42 78650 401 178 477 82 
17 Roasso Kumamoto                         43 110860 537 204 532 165 
18 Tochigi SC                                     
19 Kataller Toyama                                     
20 Fagiano Okayama                                     
21 Kyoto Sanga FC             86 159105 2125 1051 2085 822             
22 Vissel Kobe 86 165834 1362 1024 2030 2809                         
23 Sanfrecce Hiroshima                         100 227631 2287 1209 2534 810 
24 Giravanz Kitakyushu                                     
25 JEF United Ichihara Chiba                                     
26 Oita Trinita                                     
Poi = Points Awarded; Attend = Attendance; Reve = Revenue; Payro = Payroll; OC = Other Cost; TA = Total Assets               
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Table 3.4 (Continued) 
          2009(18) 2010(19) 
OBS Team Name Poi Attend Reve Payro O C T A Poi Attend Reve Payro O C T A 
1 Consadole Sapporo 79 265376 1548 699 1683 1022 46 193280 1132 500 1366 840 
2 Vegalta Sendai 106 336719 1529 711 1651 623             
3 Montedio Yamagata                         
4 Mito HollyHock 73 66818 413 163 399 89 38 64949 366 152 380 82 
5 Thespa Kusatsu 65 112584 536 182 550 150 48 79638 512 187 571 104 
6 Yokohama F.C. 44 91898 966 330 966 381 54 104230 948 545 947 489 
7 Shonan Bellmare 98 189088 1066 618 1178 521             
8 Ventforet Kofu 97 276463 1094 498 1080 463 70 223309 1067 473 1056 516 
9 Tokushima Vortis 72 105897 759 342 771 517 51 83057 854 375 799 574 
10 Avispa Fukuoka 65 194071 1006 479 1119 463 69 158777 938 401 925 440 
11 Sagan Tosu 88 154408 676 313 755 233 51 119392 816 290 829 240 
12 Kashiwa Reysol             80 145766 2743 1485 2698 1819 
13 Tokyo Verdy 1969 74 143539 888 1044 2342 453 58 100297 718 347 1081 488 
14 Ehime F.C. 47 96054 503 203 502 245 48 78945 472 216 495 218 
15 Cerezo Osaka 104 247796 2241 1085 2319 622             
16 FC Gifu 62 107557 420 156 464 122 45 55950 519 186 505 81 
17 Roasso Kumamoto 58 150150 616 226 613 108 54 124317 668 251 665 145 
18 Tochigi SC 37 117643 580 247 627 126 50 74821 661 278 656 113 
19 Kataller Toyama 61 93507 610 168 586 185 28 80327 573 199 593 156 
20 Fagiano Okayama 36 154039 639 191 614 261 32 128900 695 282 669 232 
21 Kyoto Sanga FC                         
22 Vissel Kobe                         
23 Sanfrecce Hiroshima                         
24 Giravanz Kitakyushu             15 75393 495 169 493 89 
25 JEF United Ichihara Chiba             61 210394 2306 1349 2622 1483 
26 Oita Trinita             41 188340 1108 473 1018 216 
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Table 3.5 DEA Scores in J1         
    2006(18)
a
 2007(18)
a
 2008(18)
a
 2009(18)
a
 2010(18)
a
 
OBS Club Name CRS VRS CRS VRS CRS VRS CRS VRS CRS VRS 
1 Kashima Antlers 0.8417 0.8905 1.0000 1.0000 0.9885 1.0000 0.9851 1.0000 0.9035 1.0000 
2 Urawa Red Diamonds 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9940 1.0000 0.9778 1.0000 
3 Omiya Ardija 0.9433 0.9919 0.8776 0.8827 0.9260 0.9316 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
4 Yokohama F・Marinos 0.8430 0.9588 0.9684 0.9763 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
5 Albirex Niigata 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
6 Shimizu S-Pulse 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9842 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9569 0.9970 
7 Jubilo Iwata 0.9473 1.0000 0.9517 0.9520 0.8525 0.8617 0.9730 0.9736 1.0000 1.0000 
8 Nagoya Grampus Eight 0.9488 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9854 1.0000 0.9801 1.0000 
9 Kawasaki Frontale 0.9103 1.0000 0.9504 0.9698 0.9731 1.0000 0.9805 1.0000 0.9521 0.9724 
10 Gamba Osaka 0.9363 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9584 1.0000 0.9985 1.0000 0.9391 0.9815 
11 F.C. Tokyo 0.9755 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9856 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
12 JEF United Ichihara Chiba 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8505 0.8516 
  
13 Sanfrecce Hiroshima 0.9144 1.0000 0.8891 0.9015 
  
0.9744 1.0000 0.8673 0.8710 
14 Oita Trinita 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8378 0.9682 
  
15 Vissel Kobe 
  
0.9685 0.9955 0.8167 0.9327 0.8649 0.8668 0.8384 0.8441 
16 Kashiwa Reysol 
  
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
  
17 Kyoto Sanga FC 0.7482 0.8114 
  
0.9355 0.9610 0.8965 0.8979 0.8531 0.8731 
18 Cerezo Osaka 1.0000 1.0000 
      
0.9958 1.0000 
19 Ventforet Kofu 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
      
20 Montedio Yamagata 
      
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
21 Tokyo Verdy 1969 
    
0.8927 0.9222 
    
22 Avispa Fukuoka 0.9155 0.9525 
        
23 Yokohama F.C. 
  
0.9493 1.0000 
      
24 Vegalta Sendai 
        
1.0000 1.0000 
25 Consadole Sapporo 
    
0.9021 1.0000 
    
26 Shonan Bellmare 
        
0.9623 1.0000 
a
 the number in brackets following each year is the number of teams playing in J1 in that year. 
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Table 3.6 DEA Scores in J2             
    2006(13)
a
 2007(13)
a
 2008(15)
a
 2009(18)
a
 2010(19)
a
 
OBS Club Name CRS VRS CRS VRS CRS VRS CRS VRS CRS VRS 
1 Consadole Sapporo 0.7520 0.9293 1.0000 1.0000 
  
0.8836 1.0000 0.8223 0.9840 
2 Vegalta Sendai 0.9336 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9581 1.0000 0.8909 1.0000 
  
3 Montedio Yamagata 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
    
4 Mito HollyHock 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
5 Thespa Kusatsu 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9923 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
6 Yokohama F.C. 0.9176 1.0000 
  
0.9097 1.0000 0.9607 1.0000 0.9367 0.9471 
7 Shonan Bellmare 0.8122 0.8821 0.9466 1.0000 0.8500 0.8791 0.8696 0.9707 
  
8 Ventforet Kofu 
    
0.9952 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
9 Tokushima Vortis 0.9365 0.9506 0.8900 0.8965 0.9512 0.9532 0.9457 0.9573 1.0000 1.0000 
10 Avispa Fukuoka 
  
0.9720 1.0000 0.9357 1.0000 0.8637 0.8873 0.9907 1.0000 
11 Sagan Tosu 1.0000 1.0000 0.9958 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9099 1.0000 0.9972 1.0000 
12 Kashiwa Reysol 0.8555 1.0000 
      
0.9341 1.0000 
13 Tokyo Verdy 1969 0.7178 0.8649 0.9511 1.0000 
  
0.3732 0.4738 0.7429 0.8333 
14 Ehime F.C. 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9726 0.9847 0.9635 0.9653 0.9823 1.0000 
15 Cerezo Osaka 
  
0.9575 1.0000 0.9419 1.0000 0.9310 1.0000 
  
16 FC Gifu 
    
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
17 Roasso Kumamoto 
    
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
18 Tochigi SC 
      
0.9069 0.9127 0.9683 1.0000 
19 Kataller Toyama 
      
1.0000 1.0000 0.9998 1.0000 
20 Fagiano Okayama 
      
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
21 Kyoto Sanga FC 
  
0.9643 1.0000 
      
22 Vissel Kobe 0.6125 0.6832 
        
23 Sanfrecce Hiroshima 
    
0.8760 1.0000 
    
24 Giravanz Kitakyushu 
        
1.0000 1.0000 
25 JEF United Ichihara Chiba 
        
0.8080 1.0000 
26 Oita Trinita                 1.0000 1.0000 
a
 the number in brackets following each year is the number of teams playing in J2 in that year 
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Table 3.7 Malmquist Index including both Efficiency change and Technical change in J1   
    Changes in 2007 compared to 2006   Changes in 2008 compared to 2007   
OBS Teams 
Efficiency 
change 
Technical 
change 
Malmquist 
Index   
Efficiency 
change 
Technical 
change 
Malmquist 
Index   
1 Kashima Antlers 1.1880 0.9200 1.0929   0.9885 0.9710 0.9599   
2 Urawa Red Diamonds 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000   1.0000 1.0000 1.0000   
3 Omiya Ardija 0.9304 0.9847 0.9162   1.0551 0.9692 1.0226   
4 Yokohama F・Marinos 1.1488 0.9679 1.1119   1.0326 0.9841 1.0162   
5 Albirex Niigata 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000   1.0000 1.0000 1.0000   
6 Shimizu S-Pulse 1.0000 0.9946 0.9946   0.9842 1.0080 0.9921   
7 Jubilo Iwata 1.0046 0.9881 0.9926   0.8958 0.9741 0.8726   
8 Nagoya Grampus Eight 1.0540 0.9835 1.0366   1.0000 1.0000 1.0000   
9 Kawasaki Frontale 1.0441 0.9298 0.9708   1.0239 1.0135 1.0376   
10 Gamba Osaka 1.0680 0.9017 0.9630   0.9584 1.0442 1.0008   
11 F.C. Tokyo 1.0251 0.9877 1.0125   1.0000 1.0000 1.0000   
12 JEF United Ichihara Chiba 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000   1.0000 1.0000 1.0000   
13 Sanfrecce Hiroshima 0.9724 0.9563 0.9300           
14 Oita Trinita 1.0000 0.9298 0.9298   1.0000 1.0000 1.0000   
15 Vissel Kobe         0.8433 1.1926 1.0057   
16 Kashiwa Reysol         1.0000 1.0074 1.0074   
17 Kyoto Sanga FC                 
18 Ventforet Kofu 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000           
19 Montedio Yamagata                 
  Mean 1.0290 0.9696 0.9967   0.9855 1.0109 0.9943   
  Maximum 1.1880 1.0000 1.1119   1.0551 1.1926 1.0376   
  Minimum 0.9304 0.9017 0.9162   0.8433 0.9692 0.8726   
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Table 3.7 (Continued) 
    Changes in 2009 compared to 2008   Changes in 2010 compared to 2009 
OBS Teams 
Efficiency 
change 
Technical 
change 
Malmquist 
Index   
Efficiency 
change 
Technical 
change 
Malmquist 
Index 
1 Kashima Antlers 0.9966 1.0014 0.9980   0.9171 1.0662 0.9778 
2 Urawa Red Diamonds 0.9940 1.0030 0.9970   0.9837 0.9816 0.9656 
3 Omiya Ardija 1.0799 0.9794 1.0576   1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
4 Yokohama F・Marinos 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000   1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
5 Albirex Niigata 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000   1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
6 Shimizu S-Pulse 1.0160 1.0001 1.0161   0.9569 1.0034 0.9601 
7 Jubilo Iwata 1.1414 0.9630 1.0992   1.0277 1.0124 1.0405 
8 Nagoya Grampus Eight 0.9854 0.9910 0.9766   0.9946 1.0170 1.0116 
9 Kawasaki Frontale 1.0077 0.9877 0.9952   0.9710 1.0243 0.9946 
10 Gamba Osaka 1.0418 0.9616 1.0018   0.9406 1.0249 0.9640 
11 F.C. Tokyo 0.9856 1.0332 1.0183   1.0146 0.9928 1.0073 
12 JEF United Ichihara Chiba 0.8505 1.0006 0.8511         
13 Sanfrecce Hiroshima         0.8902 1.0077 0.8971 
14 Oita Trinita 0.8378 1.1054 0.9261         
15 Vissel Kobe 1.0589 1.0028 1.0619   0.9694 1.0447 1.0127 
16 Kashiwa Reysol 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000         
17 Kyoto Sanga FC 0.9583 0.9719 0.9313   0.9516 1.0609 1.0095 
18 Ventforet Kofu               
19 Montedio Yamagata         1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
  Mean 0.9971 1.0001 0.9956   0.9745 1.0157 0.9894 
  Maximum 1.1414 1.1054 1.0992   1.0277 1.0662 1.0405 
  Minimum 0.8378 0.9616 0.8511   0.8902 0.9816 0.8971 
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Table 3.8 Malmquist Index including both Efficiency change and Technical change in J2   
    Changes in 2007 compared to 2006   Changes in 2008 compared to 2007   
OBS Teams 
Efficiency 
change 
Technical 
change 
Malmquist 
Index   
Efficiency 
change 
Technical 
change 
Malmquist 
Index   
1 Consadole Sapporo 1.3298 0.8879 1.1807           
2 Vegalta Sendai 1.0711 0.9595 1.0277   0.9581 1.0216 0.9788   
3 Montedio Yamagata 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000   1.0000 1.0000 1.0000   
4 Mito HollyHock 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000   1.0000 1.0052 1.0052   
5 Thespa Kusatsu 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000   1.0000 1.0000 1.0000   
6 Yokohama F.C.                 
7 Shonan Bellmare 1.1655 1.0029 1.1689   0.8979 0.9751 0.8755   
8 Ventforet Kofu                 
9 Tokushima Vortis 0.9504 0.9633 0.9155   1.0687 0.9756 1.0426   
10 Avispa Fukuoka         0.9627 0.9722 0.9360   
11 Sagan Tosu 0.9958 1.0021 0.9979   1.0043 1.0028 1.0071   
12 Tokyo Verdy 1969 1.3250 1.0128 1.3420           
13 Ehime F.C. 1.0000 0.9685 0.9685   0.9726 1.0019 0.9744   
14 Cerezo Osaka         0.9837 0.9766 0.9607   
15 FC Gifu                 
16 Roasso Kumamoto                 
17 Tochigi SC                 
18 Kataller Toyama                 
19 Fagiano Okayama                 
  Mean 1.0838 0.9797 1.0601   0.9848 0.9931 0.9780   
  Maximum 1.3298 1.0128 1.3420   1.0687 1.0216 1.0426   
  Minimum 0.9504 0.8879 0.9155   0.8979 0.9722 0.8755   
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Table 3.8 (Continued)           
    Changes in 2009 compared to 2008   Changes in 2010 compared to 2009 
OBS Teams 
Efficiency 
change 
Technical 
change 
Malmquist 
Index   
Efficiency 
change 
Technical 
change 
Malmquist 
Index 
1 Consadole Sapporo       0.9305 0.9866 0.9181 
2 Vegalta Sendai 0.9299 1.0457 0.9723         
3 Montedio Yamagata             
4 Mito HollyHock 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000   1.0000 0.9836 0.9836 
5 Thespa Kusatsu 0.9923 1.0039 0.9962   1.0077 0.9782 0.9858 
6 Yokohama F.C. 1.0560 1.0390 1.0971   0.9750 0.9931 0.9683 
7 Shonan Bellmare 1.0231 1.0129 1.0363         
8 Ventforet Kofu 1.0048 1.0069 1.0117   1.0000 0.9853 0.9853 
9 Tokushima Vortis 0.9942 1.0103 1.0045   1.0574 0.9781 1.0343 
10 Avispa Fukuoka 0.9230 1.0196 0.9411   1.1470 0.9837 1.1283 
11 Sagan Tosu 0.9099 1.0593 0.9638   1.0960 0.9296 1.0188 
12 Tokyo Verdy 1969       1.9906 0.9078 1.8071 
13 Ehime F.C. 0.9907 1.0172 1.0077   1.0195 0.9482 0.9667 
14 Cerezo Osaka 0.9884 1.0075 0.9959         
15 FC Gifu 1.0000 1.0645 1.0645   1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
16 Roasso Kumamoto 1.0000 1.0046 1.0046   1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
17 Tochigi SC         1.0676 0.9678 1.0333 
18 Kataller Toyama       0.9998 0.9899 0.9897 
19 Fagiano Okayama       1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
  Mean 0.9856 1.0224 1.0074   1.0861 0.9755 1.0546 
  Maximum 1.0560 1.0645 1.0971   1.9906 1.0000 1.8071 
  Minimum 0.9099 1.0000 0.9411   0.9305 0.9078 0.9181 
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Table 3.9 (2007) Technical Change in J1 
OBS TEAM NAME E2006(y2006, x2006) E2007(y2007, x2007) E2007(y2006, x2006) E2006(y2007, x2007) 
1 Kashima Antlers 0.84 1.00 0.90 0.91 
2 Urawa Red Diamonds 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
3 Omiya Ardija 0.94 0.88 1.00 0.90 
4 Yokohama F・Marinos 0.84 0.97 0.88 0.95 
5 Albirex Niigata 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
6 Shimizu S-Pulse 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 
7 Jubilo Iwata 0.95 0.95 0.98 0.96 
8 Nagoya Grampus Eight 0.95 1.00 0.98 1.00 
9 Kawasaki Frontale 0.91 0.95 1.00 0.90 
10 Gamba Osaka 0.94 1.00 1.00 0.87 
11 F.C. Tokyo 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 
12 JEF United Ichihara Chiba 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
13 Sanfrecce Hiroshima 0.91 0.89 1.00 0.89 
14 Oita Trinita 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.86 
15 Ventforet Kofu 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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Appendix:  
Primal and Dual Problems in DEA 
Observe that if we have two valid inequalities 
             
Then we can deduce that the inequality  
        
In fact, we also scale the inequalities by a positive multiplicative factor before adding them up, 
so for every nonnegative value        we also have 
                   
Suppose we have a maximization linear program in standard form. 
The transformation from Primal problem to Dual problems with optimization in DEA can be 
shown as  
    ∑     
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